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THE NEW PROFESSIONAL PLAINTIFFS IN SHAREHOLDER
LITIGATION
Jessica Erickson*
Abstract
In 1995, Congress solved the problem of professional plaintiffs in
shareholder litigation—or so it thought. The Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act (PSLRA) was designed to end the influence of shareholder
plaintiffs who had little or no connection to the underlying suit. Yet it may
have failed to accomplish its goal. In the wake of the PSLRA, many
professional plaintiffs simply moved into other types of corporate lawsuits.
In shareholder derivative suits and acquisition class actions across the
country, professional plaintiffs are back. They are repeat filers involved in
dozens of lawsuits. They are the attorneys’ spouses, parents, and children.
They may even be entities created for the primary purpose of filing
litigation. These new professional plaintiffs have flown almost entirely
under the radar of corporate law scholarship. This Article pulls back the
curtain on professional plaintiffs, examining court filings and other public
records in the first comprehensive study of professional plaintiffs’ role in
corporate law. In most instances, professionalism is a good thing—but not
when it comes to choosing plaintiffs.
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INTRODUCTION
In the early 1990s, corporate America claimed to be under siege by
professional plaintiffs. Companies asserted that plaintiffs were filing
securities class actions armed with little more than suspicion of bad
business decisions.1 According to conventional lore, these plaintiffs
worked in tandem with their attorneys, deliberately positioning themselves
to file lawsuits by purchasing a few shares of stock in a large number of
public companies.2 Investor groups joined in the chorus, arguing that these
1. See, e.g., Securities Litigation Reform: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecomms. &
Fin. of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong. 216, 499–503 (1994) [hereinafter
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecomms. & Fin.] (testimony of Stephen F. Smith, General
Counsel and Dir. of Investor Relations, Exabyte Corporation); Common Sense Legal Reform Act:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecomms. & Fin. of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
104th Cong. 39–42 (1995) (statement of James Kimsey, Chairman, America Online, Inc.).
2. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 32–33 (1995) (Conf. Rep.) (“Professional plaintiffs who
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plaintiffs had little incentive to protect the interests of absent class
members.3 The system was broken, and many critics placed the blame
squarely with professional plaintiffs.
In response, Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995 (PSLRA).4 The PSLRA overhauled enforcement of the federal
securities laws. It placed strict limits on the number of securities class
actions that a single investor could file, and it prohibited investors from
receiving payment in exchange for lending their names to litigation.5 It also
established a rebuttable presumption that the lead plaintiff would be the
applicant with the largest financial stake in the litigation.6 These provisions
created strong incentives for large institutional investors to take control of
securities class actions.
In the wake of the PSLRA, concerns about professional plaintiffs
largely faded.7 Since 1995, there has been scholarly debate over the role of
large, institutional investors, but not an in-depth discussion of other, more
traditional types of professional plaintiffs in corporate law scholarship.8 In
short, scholars and policy makers have declared “Mission Accomplished”
in the world of shareholder litigation.9
Yet, entirely under the radar of corporate law scholarship, the war goes
on. Professional plaintiffs have not disappeared—many have simply
moved to other types of corporate lawsuits. Because the PSLRA only
covers federal securities class actions,10 it does not apply to shareholder
suits that arise under state law.11 In these suits, professional plaintiffs may
own a nominal number of shares in a wide array of public companies permit lawyers readily to file
abusive securities class action lawsuits.”); S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 6 (1995) (“Lawyers typically rely
on repeat, or ‘professional,’ plaintiffs who, because they own a token number of shares in many
companies, regularly lend their names to lawsuits.”).
3. See, e.g., Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecomms. & Fin., supra note 1, at 54
(letter from pension fund managers to Sens. Christopher Dodd and Pete Domenici); id. at 447–55
(testimony of Bartlett Naylor, National Coordinator of the Office of Corporate Affairs, Int’l
Brotherhood of Teamsters).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2006).
5. Id. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(vi), (4).
6. Id. §§ 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)–(v).
7. I am referring here to individuals who serve as plaintiffs in shareholder suits. As
discussed below, many institutions—especially labor and public pension funds—have also begun to
serve as repeat plaintiffs in these suits. This Article focuses almost exclusively on the role of
individual plaintiffs, rather than these institutional plaintiffs.
8. Recent court decisions typically only mention professional plaintiffs when discussing prePSLRA history or interpreting specific provisions in the PSLRA. See, e.g., In re ESS Tech., Inc.
Secs. Litig., No. C-02-04497RMW, 2007 WL 3231729, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2007); In re
Sterling Fin. Corp. Secs. Class Action, No. 07-2171, 2007 WL 4570729, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 21,
2007). The Milberg Weiss indictments were more recent, but related almost entirely to pre-PSLRA
allegations. See infra pp. 7–9.
9. See President George W. Bush, Remarks on the USS Abraham Lincoln (May 1, 2003).
10. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(1) (2006).
11. As discussed below, the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act, which Congress
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be alive and well, often using the exact same practices that Congress
thought it eliminated back in 1995.
How have professional plaintiffs stayed out of the legal limelight? In
large part, the answer is that no one is looking for them. This Article shines
a spotlight on the phenomenon of professional plaintiffs by looking in the
most obvious place of all—the public record. This Article relies on
publicly available documents to conduct the first examination of
professional plaintiffs in shareholder litigation. These documents include
court filings from state and federal courts across the country, including
many unpublished decisions that have gone unnoticed in legal scholarship.
This Article also relies on even less conventional sources, including
business registration statements, marriage licenses, and obituaries.
Who are the new professional plaintiffs? Research reveals four possible
types of professional plaintiffs in shareholder litigation today. First, the
plaintiffs are repeat plaintiffs.12 They file multiple lawsuits, some allegedly
knowing little about the underlying claims. Second, the plaintiffs are
attorneys or their family members.13 Rather than justifying their claims to
independent shareholders, many attorneys appear to rely on their spouses,
children, and other family members to serve as plaintiffs. Third, the
plaintiffs may be entities created, at least in part, for the purpose of filing
litigation.14 Some shareholders may have created partnerships or other
entities for the primary purpose of filing litigation. Finally, some plaintiffs
may not meet the most basic requirements for filing these lawsuits.15
This phenomenon is disturbing, but is it widespread? The short answer
is that we do not know. With limited public information, it is impossible to
unearth the full extent of these practices. Yet the incentives in shareholder
litigation, combined with the data presented here, give reason to believe
that there may be a systemic problem, at least among some types of cases.
Shareholder litigation is extremely profitable for plaintiffs’ attorneys, often
resulting in hourly fees of $500 or more.16 Attorneys cannot file these suits
without plaintiffs, a requirement that is considered “one of the most

passed after the PSLRA, preempts certain types of state law claims. It does not, however, preempt
the claims at issue in this Article—shareholder derivative suits and most acquisition class actions.
See Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227,
3229 (1998).
12. See infra Section II.A.
13. See infra Section II.B.
14. See infra Section II.C.
15. See infra Section II.D.
16. See Elliott J. Weiss & Lawrence J. White, File Early, Then Free Ride: How Delaware
Law (Mis)Shapes Shareholder Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1797, 1830 (2004) (noting that for
acquisition class action settlements that involved no monetary recovery, the median fee awarded
was $472 per hour; for settlements that involved a monetary recovery, the median fee awarded was
$1,240 per hour).
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challenging aspects” of a class action.17 Add to that the fact that defense
attorneys and judges rarely inquire into the background of shareholder
plaintiffs,18 and incentives exist for unscrupulous behavior.
These practices also cast a negative light on the vast majority of
plaintifs’ law firms that likely do not engage in these practices. Hearing
about these practices, one could conclude that they are commonplace, even
if they are in fact restricted to a fairly small group of firms. Yet, the
reputational effects may dissuade legitimate plaintiffs from getting
involved in shareholder suits and may ultimately lessen the deterrence
value of these suits.
This impact should matter to corporate investors. Litigation plays a
crucial role in protecting investors, allowing them to hold corporate
managers accountable for their misdeeds. Yet, as the law and economics
literature demonstrates, when left to their own devices, plaintiffs’ attorneys
do not always make decisions that are in the best interests of investors.19
Instead they can agree to what economists term “non-zero sum”
settlements that benefit the plaintiffs’ attorney without the defendant
incurring any significant loss, while “an absent third party, the corporation,
bears the expenses of both sides.”20 These settlements are common in
shareholder litigation.21 Shareholder plaintiffs are the last line of defense
against these opportunistic settlements. By design, however, professional
plaintiffs do not perform this function.22 In short, professional plaintiffs are
a problem, both for investors and for the legal system more generally.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I describes the old professional
plaintiffs in shareholder litigation, detailing Congress’s efforts in the 1990s
to eliminate these plaintiffs. Part II describes the new professional plaintiffs
in shareholder litigation, combining empirical data with a discussion of
illustrative cases. Part III builds on this discussion by proposing a new
conceptual framework to address the problem of professional plaintiffs in
17. BRIAN ANDERSON & ANDREW TRASK, THE CLASS ACTION PLAYBOOK 75 (Oxford Univ.
Press 2010).
18. See infra pp. 37–38.
19. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 669, 671–72 (1986); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’
Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and
Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (1991); Weiss & White, supra note 16, at
1799.
20. For a description of these settlements, see John C. Coffee, Jr., The Unfaithful Champion:
The Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, 48 LAW. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 25 (1985).
21. See Jessica M. Erickson, Corporate Governance in the Courtroom: An Empirical
Analysis, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1749, 1807–08 (2010); Weiss & White, supra note 16, at 1828.
22. Indeed, this problem first came to my attention through the efforts of two investors who
had become disillusioned with the law’s efforts to protect their financial interests. These two
investors have conducted considerable research into the problem of professional plaintiffs in
shareholder litigation today, and their work was valuable in assisting my own efforts.
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corporate litigation.
I. THE OLD PROFESSIONAL PLAINTIFFS
In corporate litigation and elsewhere, professional plaintiffs have long
been criticized as “professional pawn[s]” who help attorneys line their
pockets at the expense of the real victims of legal injustice.23 This criticism
was common in the corporate arena prior to the reform of the federal
securities laws in 1995.24 The criticism focused on the most prominent area
of corporate litigation—securities class actions. Unlike the state law claims
addressed in Part II, securities class actions are brought under federal law.
In securities class actions, shareholders typically allege that the corporation
lied to the market about its business model or financial results. This Part
provides an overview of the problem as it existed prior to 1995, as well as
Congress’s efforts to solve it.
A. Historical Critique
In the 1980s and early 1990s, corporate America claimed to be under
attack in courtrooms across the country.25 Companies claimed that
securities class actions were filed within days, or even hours, of a drop in
the company’s stock price.26 As one executive asserted, “The duty to
investigate has been reduced to perusal of the morning paper.”27 This
charge was aimed largely at a single target—professional plaintiffs. This
23. Rodriguez v. Investco, L.L.C., 305 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1285 (M.D. Fla. 2004); see also
Gordon v. Virtumundo, Inc., 575 F.3d 1040, 1056–57 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting that some plaintiffs
have created “litigation mill[s]” to “seek[] out and captur[e]” unlawful activity to use in their
“prolific lawsuits”); Murray v. GMAC Mortg. Corp., 2005 WL 3019412, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 8,
2005) (denigrating professional plaintiffs as willing to accept a “quick and easy class settlement
without the need for actually putting in any real effort representing the proposed class members in
this action”).
24. These concerns are reflected in the Congressional Record leading up to the passage of the
PSLRA. See supra note 2.
25. These claims are reflected in dozens of letters that corporations sent to members of
Congress , as well as in the testimony of numerous corporate executives. See, e.g., Securities
Litigation Reform Proposals: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Sec. of the Comm. on Banking,
Hous. & Urban Affairs, 104th Cong. 19–21 (1995) (prepared statement of Christopher J. Murphy
III, CEO, 1st Source Corporation); Letter from William E. Foster, Chairman & CEO, Stratus
Computer, Inc., to Sen. Edward Kennedy (Dec. 27, 1993) (on file with author); Letter from Thomas
M. Walker, CFO of Information Resources, Inc., to the Hon. Carol Moseley-Braun (July 5, 1994)
(on file with author).
26. According to statements in Congress, approximately 20% of securities class actions were
filed within forty-eight hours of the announcement of bad news. See Securities Litigation Reform
Proposals: Hearings on S.240, S.667, and H.R. 1058 Before the Subcomm. on Sec. of the Comm.
on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 104th Cong. 118 (1995) (statement of Sen. Peter Domenici).
27. Supplemental Testimony of Stephen F. Smith, General Counsel and Dir. of Investor
Relations of Exabyte Corp. Concerning Litigation Under the Fed. Sec. Laws Before the Subcomm.
On Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong. 503 (1994).
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Section describes the professional plaintiffs who drew the attention of
Congress and the courts in the pre-1995 period. As we shall see, the debate
regarding these plaintiffs was part of a broader debate about the role of
litigation in policing corporate misconduct.
1. Repeat Plaintiffs
The plaintiffs who most provoked Congress’s ire in the pre-1995 period
were repeat plaintiffs who filed dozens of securities class actions.28
According to conventional lore, these plaintiffs typically owned a small
number of shares in a large number of public companies.29 These
investment portfolios put them in a prime position to file lawsuits against a
wide range of companies. As one judge wryly described them, these
plaintiffs were “the unluckiest and most victimized investors in the history
of the securities business.”30
Viewed in isolation, repeat plaintiffs are not necessarily problematic.
After all, plaintiffs who file multiple lawsuits get experience as class
representatives. As a result, they may come to understand more about the
underlying allegations in corporate fraud claims. In other words,
experience might be a good thing.
In Congress, however, no one seemed to think so. Congress was
concerned that repeat plaintiffs were not properly representing the interests
of absent class members.31 Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that the named plaintiff in a class action must “fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class.”32 In the early 1990s,
lawmakers were concerned that repeat plaintiffs were not fulfilling this
obligation for two reasons.
First, Congress believed that many repeat plaintiffs knew little about the
lawsuits brought in their names.33 As one congressional report noted, “In
many cases the ‘lead plaintiff’ has not even read the complaint.”34 This fact
was problematic because the role of representative plaintiffs is to monitor
class counsel, ensuring that litigation decisions reflect the best interests of
the class. Shareholder plaintiffs who are not familiar with the underlying
claims cannot perform this responsibility. To be fair, Congress may have
overstated the role of these plaintiffs. Shareholder plaintiffs often play a
nominal role in class action litigation, and many attorneys operate
“virtually [as] independent entrepreneur[s]” in a role similar to a private

28. See, e.g., supra note 2.
29. See id.
30. In re Urcarco Secs. Litig., 148 F.R.D. 561, 563 (N.D. Tex. 1993).
31. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-369, at 33 (1995).
32. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
33. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 33 (Conf. Rep.).
34. See id.
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attorney general.35 Yet Congress wanted a greater role for shareholder
plaintiffs in securities class actions.
Second, Congress suspected that shareholders were being paid to serve
as repeat plaintiffs in securities class actions. In its official legislative
report, the House of Representatives stated that “lead plaintiffs often
receive compensation in the form of bounty payments or bonuses.”36 The
Senate Report similarly stated that “[p]rofessional plaintiffs often are
motivated by the payment of a ‘bonus’ far in excess of their share of any
recovery.”37 Such payments created a conflict of interest between the
shareholder plaintiff and the rest of the class. While class members want
the highest possible recovery, named plaintiffs who have been promised a
kickback may be more interested in securing their own personal payout
than in protecting the class.
Later investigations proved lawmakers right. The Department of Justice
subsequently brought criminal charges against the largest plaintiffs’ firm in
the country, Milberg Weiss LLP, and four of the firm’s attorneys.38 These
charges related almost exclusively to conduct that occurred prior to 1995.
During this time period, as the defendants later admitted, the firm
maintained a roster of shareholders to serve as plaintiffs in securities class
actions.39 The firm paid those shareholders a portion of the fees that the
firms received, typically 10%.40 According to court documents, “[b]y
entering into such secret payment arrangements, [the attorneys] were able
to secure a reliable source of individuals who were ready, willing, and able
to serve as named plaintiffs in [c]lass [a]ctions that Milberg Weiss wanted
to bring.”41 Following the indictments, Milberg Weiss agreed to pay $75
million dollars to settle the criminal charges,42 and certain partners at the
firm agreed to pay substantial fines and go to prison.43 In short, Congress
35. Coffee, supra note 19, at 681.
36. H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 33 (Conf. Rep.).
37. S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 10 (1995).
38. See First Superseding Indictment, United States v. Milberg Weiss Bershad & Schulman
LLP, CR 05-587(A) (May 18, 2006 C.D. Cal.).
39. Statement of Facts in Support of David J. Bershad Plea Agreement and Information,
United States v. Milberg Weiss Bershad & Schulman, CR 05-587(A)-JFW., 2009 BL 152534 ¶ 4
(C.D. Cal. July 6, 2007).
40. Id. ¶ 6.
41. Id. ¶ 7.
42. A Stiff Fine, but No Trial, for Milberg, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2008, available at
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/ 2008/06/17/milberg-firm-said-to-be-near-a-deal/ (explaining that
under the firm’s latest agreement with prosecutors, the firm will pay the government $75 million).
43. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Central District of California,
William Lerach, Former Name Partner in Milberg Weiss, to Plead Guilty to Conspiracy to Obstruct
Justice and Make False Statements to Federal Judges across U.S. (Sept. 18, 2007) (noting that a
former partner agreed to plead guilty; to pay a $250,000 fine; to forfeit $7.75 million to the
government; and to receive a one to two year sentence in federal prison); A Stiff Fine, but
No Trial, for Milberg, supra note 42 (explaining that one of the firm’s famous partners is in prison
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was right when it suspected back in 1995 that at least some plaintiffs were
being paid to participate in securities class actions.
2. Lawyers and Their Families as Plaintiffs
During this pre-1995 period, many plaintiffs’ lawyers also served as
plaintiffs in shareholder suits. There is no empirical data reflecting how
often this occurred, but academic scholarship discussed the phenomenon
openly. Professor John Coffee observed, for example, that “some
plaintiff’s law firms [have] even invested their own firm’s profit-sharing
plan broadly in the stocks of numerous corporations in order to have an inhouse plaintiff at hand.”44 He also stated that “[f]requently . . . one
plaintiff’s attorney will serve as a client for another.”45 Similarly, in 1993,
Fortune Magazine documented how a well-known plaintiffs’ firm had
asked another plaintiffs’ attorney to “provide the . . . firm with a list of his
stock holdings . . . and keep it up to date,” allowing the firm to file at least
six securities class actions on the attorney’s behalf.46
As courts have recognized, these cases raised the possibility of a
conflict of interest between the attorney plaintiff and the rest of the class.
In the 1993 decision Jaroslawicz v. Safety Kleen Corp.,47 for example, a
federal court denied plaintiff David Jaroslawicz’s motion to serve as class
representative in a securities class action.48 In denying the motion, the
court noted that Mr. Jaroslawicz, a personal injury attorney in New York
City, had served as co-counsel in at least forty-two other cases with
Pomerantz Levy Haudek Block & Grossman (Pomerantz Levy), one of the
two firms representing the class.49 In other words, Mr. Jaroslawicz was
represented by Pomerantz Levy in the lawsuit before the court, but was cocounsel with Pomerantz Levy in a number of other suits. As a result, Mr.
Jaroslawicz potentially had a significant financial interest in maintaining
the goodwill of Pomerantz Levy, which the court feared could overshadow
his commitment to the class.50 The court also stated that the litigation
appeared to be “manufactured,” and it noted that Mr. Jaroslawicz owned
only thirteen and a half shares of stock in the defendant corporation, worth
approximately $400.51
There was also evidence in the pre-1995 period that lawyers used their
family members as plaintiffs. Cases during this period included examples
and another one is headed there under an announced guilty plea).
44. Coffee, supra note 19, at 682.
45. Id. at 682–83 n.39.
46. Andrew E. Serwer, What to Do About Legal Blackmail, FORTUNE, Nov. 15, 1993, available
at http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/1993/11/15/78596/index. htm.
47. 151 F.R.D. 324 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
48. Id. at 326.
49. Id. at 328.
50. Id. at 329–30.
51. Id. at 326, 330.
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of attorneys using their spouses,52 parents,53 siblings,54 and other close
relatives55 as plaintiffs in securities class actions.
These cases, predictably, raised the ire of the courts. In many cases,
courts expressed concern that the plaintiff would share in the eventual
attorneys’ fees received by their attorney relative, and that these payouts
could influence the plaintiff’s representation of the class. In one case, for
example, a federal court held that a plaintiff was an inadequate class
representative because her husband was class counsel.56 The court
determined that “the potential conflict of interest inherent in this situation
is obvious” because “the possible recovery of [the plaintiff] as a member of
the class is far exceeded by the financial interest she and her husband, as a
marital unit, might have in the legal fees engendered by this lawsuit.”57
3. Entities as Plaintiffs
During this same time period, there were also indications that lawyers
may have established entities for the purpose of filing litigation. For
example, according to press accounts in 1993, an attorney in New Jersey
was suspended from the practice of law for using his own companies as
plaintiffs in his lawsuits.58 The press reported that this suspension arose
specifically out of shareholder lawsuits filed against the Trump casinos.59
The lawsuits were filed by two different entities, Peter Stuyvesant Ltd. and
Fairmount Financial Corp., using two different legal theories.60 An
investigation determined that Stuyvesant and Fairmount were in fact
related and that both entities were owned by one of the attorneys in the
litigation.61 The court was extremely critical when it discovered this
connection, stating that “[c]lass representatives are supposed to occupy a
52. See, e.g., Stull v. Poole, 63 F.R.D. 702, 704 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
53. See, e.g., Kirby v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 116 F.R.D. 303, 309 (D. Mass. 1987).
54. See, e.g., Susman v. Lincoln Am. Corp., 561 F.2d 86, 95 (7th Cir. 1977).
55. See, e.g., In re Consumers Power Co. Secs. Litig., 105 F.R.D. 583, 603 (D. Mich. 1985).
56. Stull, 63 F.R.D. at 704.
57. Id. As we shall see, this decision has not stopped other members of the firm from relying
on their own family members to serve as plaintiffs. See infra text accompanying notes 159–77.
Other courts raised related concerns even in cases where the plaintiff would not share in the
attorneys’ fees. See Susman, 561 F.2d at 95. On the other hand, a few courts have sanctioned these
relationships, holding that the relative was capable of monitoring the litigation given the particular
circumstances of the case. See, e.g., Lewis v. Goldsmith, 95 F.R.D. 15, 20 (D.N.J. 1982) (permitting
the plaintiff to serve as the class representative even though his uncle was class counsel).
58. See L. Stuart Ditzen, Richard Greenfield Is Barred by U.S. Court for One Year,
PHILADELPHIA ENQUIRER, Dec. 23, 1993, available at http://articles.philly.com/1993-1223/business/25943547_1_federal-courts-class-action.
59. See L. Stuart Ditzen, Class-Action Lawyer Suspended, Fined in N.J. for Ethical
Violations, PHILA. ENQUIRER, Nov. 17, 1993, available at http://articles.philly.com/1993-1117/business/25945045_1_class-action-suits-class-action-lawyer-trump-casinos/2.
60. See id.
61. See id.
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position of trust, championing the interests of the multitude of persons they
represent.”62 The court referred the matter to state disciplinary
authorities,63 and the attorney appears to have been fined and suspended
from the practice of law.64
B. The Problems with the Old Professional Plaintiffs
As the examples above illustrate, lawmakers were aware of a variety of
problems with professional plaintiffs prior to 1995. These problems all
reflected the same core concern about the plaintiffs’ ability to represent
absent class members in securities class actions. Plaintiffs with a conflict
of interest in the litigation—whether the promise of a private payment or
the hope of future business from class counsel—could be tempted to put
their own interests ahead of the interests of the class. Such conflicts could
make it difficult, if not impossible, for the named plaintiffs to protect the
interests of the class.
These conflicts may not appear particularly troubling given the
traditional role of shareholder plaintiffs in class action litigation. Conflict
of interest or not, these plaintiffs rarely have a meaningful role in the
litigation. Shareholder plaintiffs typically have a minimal financial stake in
the litigation, and whatever stake they do have is dwarfed by that of the
plaintiffs’ attorneys who stand to receive significant contingency fees. As a
result, one could legitimately ask why Congress was so concerned about
professional plaintiffs back in 1995. If plaintiffs rarely played a meaningful
role in these cases, why worry about professional plaintiffs?
And yet Congress was worried. Congress believed that the traditional
model of entrepreneurial litigation was broken, at least in securities class
actions. In an ideal world, plaintiffs’ attorneys protect the interests of
absent class members. The legal system tries to accomplish this ideal by
awarding plaintiffs’ attorneys a percentage of the overall recovery. This fee
structure is designed to ensure that plaintiffs’ attorneys have an incentive to
bargain for the largest possible recovery.
The problem is that these incentives do not always work, as scholars
have long recognized.65 The fact that plaintiffs’ attorneys receive a
62. Ditzen, supra note 58.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. There is a substantial body of literature on the dangers of a purely entrepreneurial model
of shareholder litigation. E.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the
Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 221 n.15 (1983)
(discussing issues of risk aversion, potential for collusion, an inadequate system, property rights,
and the disparity in search costs); Coffee, supra note 19, at 679 (discussing “opportunism and
overenforcement”); Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” and “Blackmail” Settlements in
Class Action: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1377–78 (2000) (analyzing
issues of sweetheart and blackmail settlements); Alon Klement, Who Should Guard the Guardians?
A New Approach for Monitoring Class Action Lawyers, 21 REV. LITIG. 25, 38, 72 (2002)
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percentage of the ultimate settlement does not always mean that their
incentives are aligned with those of the absent class members. As the
research of Professor John Coffee and others has demonstrated, plaintiffs’
attorneys have incentives that often cause them to underinvest in certain
types of shareholder litigation and overinvest in others.66 In the types of
suits targeted by professional plaintiffs, the concern was that attorneys
were overinvesting in litigation.
As discussed above, many believed that attorneys in the early 1990s
were filing securities class actions based on the hint of wrongdoing.67
Plaintiffs’ attorneys then used securities class actions as a means to obtain
discovery from the target corporation. This discovery was typically onesided, with the plaintiffs’ attorneys requesting mountains of documents
from the defendants but having little to produce themselves. Many
corporations agreed to nuisance settlements to avoid the high cost of
discovery and the risk of an unfavorable jury verdict at trial. In the words
of the chairman of America Online, Inc., “Even when a company
committed no fraud, indeed no negligence, there is still the remote
possibility of huge jury verdicts, not to mention the costs of litigation. In
the face of such exposure, defendant companies inevitably settle these suits
rather than go to trial.”68
Congress believed that these practices had a negative impact on
investors. Shareholder litigation represents a transfer of wealth from one
group of shareholders to another.69 In a securities class action, existing
shareholders typically pay former shareholders who bought their stock
during the class period.70 This wealth transfer makes sense if it deters
misconduct or disgorges ill-gotten gains. When litigation is filed to procure
a nuisance settlement, however, these gains disappear. In the mid-1990s,
Congress believed that many securities class actions were strike suits—
profitable for attorneys, but not beneficial for investors or the market more
generally.
Admittedly, the testimony before Congress reflected a fairly one-sided
view of the issues. Corporate America mounted a strong lobbying effort in
Congress, and the actual problems may well not have been as serious as the
(commenting on collusion, sweetheart deals, and settlement inefficiencies).
66. See Coffee, supra note 65, at 243; Coffee, supra note 19, at 686–90. These concerns are
not a uniquely American phenomenon. See Erik P.M. Vermeulen & Dirk A. Zetzsche, The Use and
Abuse of Investor Suits: An Inquiry into the Dark Side of Shareholder Activism, 7 EUR. COMPANY &
FIN. L. REV. 1, 71–72 (2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
1428901 (discussing the use of professional plaintiffs in European shareholder litigation).
67. See supra pp. 6–7.
68. H.R. REP. NO. 104-50, pt. 1, at 17 (1995).
69. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence
and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1557–61 (2006); Jill E. Fisch, Confronting the
Circularity Problem in Private Securities Litigation, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 333, 334 (2009).
70. Coffee, supra note 69, at 1557.
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companies claimed. Yet even critics of this effort recognized the need for a
better monitor of shareholder interest in these suits. For example,
Professor Joel Seligman, who argued against widespread legal changes to
the federal securities laws, stated that he was “impressed by the testimony”
related to professional plaintiffs and agreed that these plaintiffs tended to
“undermine the integrity” of the judicial process.71
When it comes to identifying a better monitor of shareholder interests,
securities class actions enjoy a distinct advantage over other types of class
action litigation. In many class actions, the plaintiffs have only a minimal
stake in the outcome. A plaintiff who is suing over a $5 free drink coupon
likely does not have the financial incentive to monitor the litigation.72 In
securities class actions, however, many shareholders do have a significant
financial interest in the litigation. Many large investors have millions of
dollars at stake in securities class actions, far more than the typical class
action plaintiff. Accordingly, shareholder litigation was uniquely situated
for reforms that placed more power in the hands of strong shareholder
plaintiffs.
C. Legislative Attack
The problems in securities class actions ultimately led to broad-based
support for new legislation in both houses of Congress. In 1995, Congress
passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act.73 The PSLRA did not
apply to shareholder suits filed under state law, including shareholder
derivative suits and acquisition class actions, but it did place strict
limitations on securities class actions filed under federal law.
Most importantly, the PSLRA ended the race to the courthouse in
which the attorney with the first-filed complaint would typically receive
control over the litigation.74 Instead Congress established a rebuttable
presumption that the investor with the largest financial loss would be the
lead plaintiff, a provision that was designed to put these suits in the hands
of large institutional investors.75 As one representative of institutional
investors testified before Congress, “As the largest shareholders in most
companies, we are the ones who have the most to gain from meritorious

71. See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecomms. & Fin., supra note 1, at 70–72 (1994)
(statements of Professor Joel Seligman).
72. See Class Action Complaint, Levitt v. Southwest Airlines Co., 846 F. Supp. 2d 956, 957–
58 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (explaining that plaintiff, who is also a lawyer at the well-known plaintiffs’ firm
of Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz LLP, filed a class action challenging Southwest
Airline’s decision not to honor free drink coupons).
73. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
74. H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 33 (1995) (Conf. Rep.) (stating that this practice caused
plaintiffs’ attorneys to become “fleet of foot and sleight of hand”).
75. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)(bb) (2006).
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securities litigation.”76
The PSLRA also included provisions aimed directly at professional
plaintiffs. The Act provided that no plaintiff shall serve in more than five
securities class actions in a three-year period.77 Additionally, plaintiffs
were barred from receiving any compensation other than their pro rata
share of the recovery and reimbursement for reasonable costs and
expenses.78 Finally, plaintiffs were required to file a sworn statement with
the complaint certifying that they (1) had reviewed the complaint and
authorized its filing, (2) had not purchased the securities at the direction of
counsel or to participate in a lawsuit, and (3) were willing to serve on
behalf of the class.79 The certification also had to list any transactions in
the securities during the class period and identify any other lawsuits in
which the plaintiff had sought to serve as lead plaintiff over the past three
years.80 These restrictions were designed to put securities class actions in
the hands of plaintiffs with a real financial stake in the litigation.
The relief that corporate America felt following the passage of the
PSLRA was short-lived. The PSLRA only applies to fraud claims brought
under the federal securities laws.81 Lawyers quickly learned that they could
make nearly the same allegations under state law and thereby avoid the
strict requirements of the PSLRA. Armed with this statutory loophole,
plaintiffs’ attorneys took their old tactics to a new venue.
Just a few years after the passage of the PSLRA, Congress was
presented with compelling evidence that its efforts had simply shifted the
problems to state court.82 While the number of securities fraud cases filed
in federal court had declined, there was an equal increase in the number of
state law securities fraud cases.83 In California alone, the number of state
securities class action filings in the first six months of 1996 was almost
five times greater than in the first six months of 1995.84 The SEC called
this shift potentially “the most significant development in securities
litigation” since passage of the PSLRA.85 The SEC’s testimony prompted
Congress to pass the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act
(SLUSA)86 in 1998. The SLUSA expressly preempted many state law
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 34 (Conf. Rep.).
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(vi).
Id. § 78u-4(a)(2)(A)(vi).
Id. § 78u-4(a)(2)(A)(i)–(iii).
Id. § 78u-4(a)(2)(A)(iv)–(v).
Id. §78u-4(b).
H.R. REP. NO. 105-803, at 14–15 (1998) (Conf. Rep.).
See id. at 14 (citation omitted).
Id. at 15. (The first six months of 1995 were prior to the passage of the PSLRA.)
U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMM’N OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNS., REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS ON THE FIRST YEAR OF PRACTICE UNDER THE PRIVATE SECURITIES
LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1995 (1997).
86. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat.
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fraud claims, preventing attorneys from filing the same suits under a
different body of law.
The SLUSA, however, included a carve-out that has proven crucial in
the subsequent revival of professional plaintiffs—it exempted all
shareholder derivative suits and many acquisition class actions.87 A
shareholder derivative suit is a suit filed under state law to vindicate
alleged wrongs committed against the corporation.88 The typical claim is
that the corporation’s managers harmed the corporation by breaching their
fiduciary duties to the corporation. Acquisition class actions are also
brought under state fiduciary duty law, but the allegations relate
specifically to a proposed merger or acquisition. In these suits, the
shareholders typically allege that the corporation’s board of directors
breached its fiduciary duties by agreeing to sell the corporation for a price
below the corporation’s true value.89 Congress likely spared these suits
from preemption because it was focused on the more traditional fraud
claims that shareholders were filing to avoid the PSLRA.90
With the passage of the SLUSA, Congress believed that its work in this
area was finally complete. The PSLRA targeted abusive practices in
securities litigation, and the follow-up legislation in 1998 gave the
necessary teeth to the PSLRA’s restrictions.
This legislation has accomplished many, but certainly not all, of its
stated goals. Today, institutional investors—primarily labor and public
pension funds—serve as the lead plaintiffs in approximately two-thirds of
all securities class actions.91 The role of these plaintiffs, however, many of
whom have become repeat plaintiffs themselves, has not been without
controversy.92 Studies show that they have been able to obtain slightly
3227 (enacted to amend the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
87. See 15 U.S.C. § 77p(d), (f)(2)(B) (2006).
88. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984).
89. In recent years, the lines between these suits have begun to blur. My own research shows
that many derivative complaints now include federal securities claims. Erickson, supra note 21, at
1774. Other commentators have noted the rise of federal claims in acquisition class actions. See
Kevin LaCroix, A Closer Look at 2011 Securities Lawsuit Filings, THE D&O DIARY (Jan. 3, 2012),
http://www.dandodiary.com/2012/01/articles/securities-litigation/a-closer-look-at-2011-secu ritieslawsuit-filings/ (stating that more than one quarter of all securities class actions in 2011 related to
mergers or acquisitions).
90. In addition, these suits have traditionally been within the province of state law, and
Congress may have been hesitant to extend its reach in this area any more than necessary. See, e.g.,
H.R. REP. NO. 105-640, at 17 (1998) (noting that the SLUSA includes “an exception to preserve
[s]tate court jurisdiction over derivative actions”).
91. Ellen M. Ryan & Laura E. Simmons, Securities Class Action Settlements: 2010 Review
and Analysis, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, at 8 (2011), http://www.cornerstone.com/files/News/029
b31a7-ff84-4000-b1ff-d177014ced27/Presentation/NewsAttachment/fd13e1e4-5564-4d46-86a3882f232147a9/Cornerstone_Research_Settlements_2010_Analysis.pdf.
92. Scholars, for example, have raised concerns that plaintiffs’ attorneys may make
substantial campaign contributions to politicians who oversee labor and public pension funds in the
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better settlements for shareholders, at least in part vindicating Congress’s
faith in them.93
In the wake of these legislative reforms, concerns about individuals
serving as professional plaintiffs faded from view. There has been no
examination of professional plaintiffs in corporate law scholarship since
1995.94 As we shall see, however, the legal system has not won the war
against professional plaintiffs. Instead these plaintiffs may have simply
moved into new legal territory.
II. THE NEW PROFESSIONAL PLAINTIFFS
As this Part documents, professional plaintiffs may be alive and well in
shareholder litigation. And they appear to be using many of the same
practices that Congress thought it eradicated back in the 1990s. In the wake
of the legislative reforms, professional plaintiffs shifted into state law
shareholder suits, specifically, acquisition class actions and shareholder
derivative suits. The discussion below groups these practices, and the
allegations that relate to them, into four categories: (1) using the same
shareholders in multiple lawsuits; (2) using plaintiffs’ lawyers or their
family members as plaintiffs; (3) using questionable entities as plaintiffs;
and (4) using shareholders who may not meet the basic qualifications to
serve as plaintiffs, including dead plaintiffs and plaintiffs who may not
know they are plaintiffs. These phenomena have flown under the radar of
corporate law scholarship and raise questions about the legitimacy of these
lawsuits.
An introductory caveat is important. This Article defines “professional
plaintiffs” to include the four types of plaintiffs above. The use of this term
does not imply anything about the plaintiffs’ involvement in these suits or
their motivation for filing these suits. Similarly, to the extent that the
hopes of representing these funds in securities suits. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi et al., The Price of
Pay to Play in Securities Class Actions, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 650, 650–51 (2011); James D.
Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Does the Plaintiff Matter? An Empirical Analysis of Lead Plaintiffs in
Securities Class Actions, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1587, 1611–14 (2006).
93. The empirical evidence is somewhat mixed, but it generally shows that institutional
investors have had a positive impact on settlement values. See Stephen J. Choi et al., Do Institutions
Matter? The Impact of the Lead Plaintiff Provision of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act,
83 WASH. U. L. Q. 869, 870 (2005) (finding that participation by public pension funds correlates
with a greater likelihood of a high value outcome but not willing to claim finding as conclusive);
James D. Cox et al., There Are Plaintiffs and . . . There are Plaintiffs: An Empirical Analysis of
Securities Class Action Settlements, 61 VAND. L. REV. 355, 385 (2008); Ryan & Simmons, supra
note 91, at 8.
94. The one notable exception is the research on acquisition class actions published by Robert
Thompson and Randall Thomas in 2004. See Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New
Look of Shareholder Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 133, 187–
89 (2004). In their article, Thompson and Thomas report detailed findings on the plaintiffs in
acquisition class actions filed in the Delaware Court of Chancery in 1999 and 2000. These findings
are discussed below.
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discussion below relies on allegations raised in various lawsuits, the
veracity of these allegations generally cannot be determined from the
available record. In the end, therefore, the illustrations and allegations
below do not, and indeed could not, cast aspersions on any particular
plaintiffs or on the plaintiffs in corporate litigation more generally. The
most they can do is illustrate that many of the practices targeted by
Congress may still occur today.
A. Repeat Plaintiffs
In enacting the PSLRA, Congress criticized repeat plaintiffs in
securities class actions as the “world’s unluckiest investors.”95 As this
Section illustrates, this bad luck has apparently continued. Although the
PSLRA largely halted the use of repeat plaintiffs in federal securities class
actions,96 the use of repeat plaintiffs has continued in shareholder lawsuits
filed under state law. This Section provides empirical data regarding the
use of repeat plaintiffs before turning to illustrative cases that highlight this
practice.
1. Empirical Data
To understand the role of repeat plaintiffs in shareholder litigation
today, one must first understand what is meant by a “repeat plaintiff.” This
Section uses the following definition: a shareholder is a repeat plaintiff if
he or she filed more than three shareholder suits over the period between
2009 and 2012 or five shareholder suits over the period between 2002 and
2012. This definition identifies plaintiffs who are regular filers of these
suits, while also giving more scrutiny to plaintiffs who have filed multiple
lawsuits in recent years.
I used several methods to track these repeat plaintiffs.97 First, I used
data collected as part of a prior empirical study on shareholder litigation in
federal court.98 Second, I supplemented that data with additional data on
state law shareholder suits in both state and federal court.99 Third, I used
95. H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 32 (1995) (Conf. Rep.).
96. As discussed below, repeat plaintiffs still play a small role in securities class actions,
although the exact nature of this role is unclear.
97. This effort, while data-driven, was not intended to identify all repeat plaintiffs. Online
state and federal docket systems are often woefully incomplete, making it impossible to identify all
shareholder suits filed by these plaintiffs. See Bernard Black et al., Is Delaware Losing Its Cases?,
at 17, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1578404 (noting that these limitations
mean that it is simply “not feasible” to examine all corporate law cases).
98. This data covered shareholder derivative suits filed in federal court in 2005 and 2006. See
Erickson, supra note 21, at 1757–58.
99. I conducted a number of searches in the dockets database and the pleadings database in
Westlaw to identify suits filed by repeat plaintiffs between 2002 and 2012. I also searched in the
EDGAR database, which includes filings with the Securities & Exchange Commission by publicly
traded corporations, for the names of many of these plaintiffs.
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data on federal securities class actions, which was generously provided by
Cornerstone Research, Stephen Choi, and Adam Pritchard.100 This
combined data, while not a complete list of all shareholder suits, allowed
me to identify a significant number of repeat plaintiffs. I then searched for
these plaintiffs in the Dockets database in Westlaw to get a more precise
count of the suits that they filed between 2002 and 2012.101
In doing so, I uncovered more than 700 lawsuits filed by repeat
plaintiffs during this ten-year period. These lawsuits were filed by more
than sixty repeat plaintiffs who filed an average of eleven lawsuits each.102
These plaintiffs were not always the only plaintiffs in these lawsuits. Many
shareholder lawsuits have multiple plaintiffs, and in many cases, more than
one repeat plaintiff filed a lawsuit against a single company. These figures
thus reflect the pervasiveness of repeat plaintiffs in shareholder litigation.
These suits were primarily filed under state law. As Table 2 below
illustrates, nearly half of these suits (47.8%) were acquisition class actions.
Another 29.3% were shareholder derivative suits. A smaller percentage of
these suits (16.8%) were securities class actions, indicating that repeat
plaintiffs do still exist in these suits as well. The remaining suits were other
types of shareholder lawsuits or could not be categorized based on the
information available.103
This mix is changing over time. Between 2010 and 2012, nearly 65
percent of cases involving repeat plaintiffs were acquisition class actions,
up from approximately 35 percent between 2002 and 2009. The increasing
use of repeat plaintiffs in these cases likely reflects the fact that acquisition
class actions have skyrocketed in popularity in recent years, forcing
plaintiffs’ firms to maintain a larger stable of shareholders willing to serve
as plaintiff at a moment’s notice.
A few of these plaintiffs are well-known to corporate lawyers. Alan R.
Kahn, for example, has been termed a “quasi-mythical figure[]” by the
Delaware Court of Chancery.104 He has served as the plaintiff in many
landmark Delaware decisions,105 several of which involve controlling
100. This data identifies the lead plaintiff or first-filed plaintiff in securities class actions filed
between 2002 and 2011. I used this data because many plaintiffs who file securities class actions
also file state law shareholder suits.
101. Given the limitations of these databases, these searches are necessarily underinclusive
and, accordingly, the numbers presented throughout this Subsection are only estimates.
102. These figures do not include plaintiffs’ attorneys or their family members who serve as
plaintiffs. Nor do they include institutions who serve as plaintiffs in multiple suits. Such plaintiffs
are discussed separately in subsequent sections.
103. In many securities class actions involving repeat plaintiffs in my study, the repeat plaintiff
owned a relatively small number of shares in the target corporation and typically did not seek
appointment as lead plaintiff.
104. In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 943 n.3 (Del. Ch. 2010).
105. See, e.g., Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d 422 (Del. 1997); Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n
Sys., Inc., 669 A.2d 79 (Del. 1995); Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48 (Del. 1991).
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shareholder transactions, an area in which shareholders are particularly
vulnerable. Based on the publicly available data reviewed here, Mr. Kahn
or members of his family have filed forty-five lawsuits over the past ten
years.106
Yet there are many more repeat plaintiffs who have not captured the
attention of courts and commentators. Doris and Steven Staehr, for
example, appear to have filed more shareholder suits than any plaintiff in
my study other than Alan Kahn—a total of forty lawsuits.107 Yet, in
discussions with defense counsel, few recognized their names. Nor have
the Staehrs drawn the attention of judges. The same is true for most of the
other repeat plaintiffs in my data set. These plaintiffs may have filed ten,
twenty, or even thirty lawsuits, but they rarely attract scrutiny. The next
question is whether they deserve scrutiny.
2. Concerns about Repeat Plaintiffs
Should the legal system care about repeat plaintiffs? Many repeat
plaintiffs may well be faithful stewards of shareholder interests, but as
Judge Frank Easterbrook observed, a repeat plaintiff “could be tempted to
file suits designed to extract payoffs from the corporation even if the
average investor will lose in the process.”108 My research uncovers two
specific reasons for this concern. First, some repeat plaintiffs appear to
have little involvement in the suits filed on their behalf. Second, there are
allegations that at least a few plaintiffs have been paid in exchange for
lending their names to litigation. These concerns are unsubstantiated, but
nonetheless mirror Congress’s concerns in the 1990s, raising serious
questions about the ability of some repeat plaintiffs to protect absent class
members.
106. My data indicates that between 2002 and 2012, Mr. Kahn personally filed forty-two
shareholder lawsuits. His wife and daughter have filed an additional three. Mr. Kahn has a long
history in the investing community, and he appears motivated by a strong commitment to corporate
governance.
107. See, e.g., Verified Shareholder Derivative Complaint for Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Waste
of Corporate Assets and Unjust Enrichment, Staehr v. Miller, No. 1:08-cv-20990-PAS (S.D. Fla.
Apr. 11, 2008); Verified Shareholder Derivative Complaint for Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Waste of
Corporate Assets, Unjust Enrichment and Violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Staehr
v. Essner, No. 1:07-cv-10465-RJS (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2007); Verified Shareholder Derivative
Complaint for Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Abuse of Control, Constructive Fraud, Gross
Mismanagement, Waste of Corporate Assets, Unjust Enrichment, Breach of Fiduciary Duties and
for Violations of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Staehr v. Burns, No. 3:06-cv-07069-JGC (N.D.
Ohio Mar. 2, 2006). The relationship between Doris and Steven Staehr is not clear, but they may be
mother and son.
108. Murray v. GMAC Mortg. Corp., 434 F.3d 948, 954 (2006). Again, my goal is not to
criticize all shareholder plaintiffs or even all shareholder plaintiffs who file a significant number of
lawsuits. Some shareholder plaintiffs take a very active role in litigation and serve as effective
monitors. My concern, as outlined below, is that others may not perform this role and that the
judicial system does little to distinguish between these two types of shareholder plaintiffs.
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a. Little Involvement in Litigation
Some repeat plaintiffs appear to have very little involvement in the
underlying litigation. Courts have long recognized that plaintiffs in
shareholder lawsuits are “nominal” plaintiffs and that attorneys therefore
control the suits.109 Yet, shareholder plaintiffs still have a duty to monitor
the litigation and exercise control over their attorneys.110 Some plaintiffs in
my study appear to be fulfilling this role diligently. Others may not be.
In one case, for example, a federal judge in the Southern District of
New York castigated plaintiff Robert Garber for being “appallingly
ignorant of the many derivative actions that have been filed in his
name.”111 Mr. Garber had filed more than twenty shareholder lawsuits
against corporations and their managers.112 When questioned about these
cases, Mr. Garber “generally could not recall basic information” about
them, including where the suits were filed, the basic allegations in the
suits, or in some instances, the corporations named as defendants.113 The
court noted that the record in the case was “startling” and reflected an
“absentee plaintiff[]” who was “at the beck and call of his friend and
fellow attorney [Alfred G.] Yates.”114
The Delaware Court of Chancery has raised similar concerns about
another shareholder plaintiff with an “uncanny zeal for litigation.”115 The
court stated that it was “troubl[ed]” by the plaintiff’s participation in the
suit because he owned only twenty-five shares of stock in the corporation,
which were purchased after the initial allegations of wrongdoing had
already emerged.116 Moreover, the court noted that the plaintiff had a
“surprising level of ignorance with respect to other lawsuits in which he is
a representative plaintiff.”117 The court stated that it could not “conclude
that [the plaintiff] is in cahoots with his counsel to generate class and
derivative litigation in bad faith. Yet when a person jumps in the ocean and
then complains of getting wet, one certainly has to wonder.”118
109. Coffee, supra note 19, at 674, 678 (referencing courts’ emphasis that plaintiff’s attorneys
have “no ‘true’ identifiable client”).
110. Cf. Jaroslawicz v. Safety Kleen Corp., 151 F.R.D. 324, 328–30 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (rejecting
adequacy of representation in part because of plaintiff’s desire to maintain goodwill with counsel,
which could lead to sub-optimal class outcome).
111. In re JPMorgan Chase & Co. S’holder Derivative Litig., No. 1:08-cv-00974-DLC, 2008
WL 4298588, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2008).
112. The exact number of suits is unclear. He testified in the JPMorgan litigation that he has
filed “approximately twenty-five other actions against corporations and their officers.” Id. at *5. My
research found that he has filed approximately twenty suits in the last ten years.
113. See id.
114. See id. at *8–9.
115. In re Fuqua Indus. Inc. S’holder Litig., 752 A.2d 126, 134 (Del. Ch. 1999).
116. Id. n.27.
117. Id. (emphasis omitted).
118. Id. (some punctuation omitted). Despite these concerns, the court declined to disqualify
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My research highlights two reasons to wonder about the involvement of
some repeat plaintiffs. First, certain plaintiffs filed many of their lawsuits
within a fairly short period of time. For example, one plaintiff filed more
than two dozen lawsuits in 2011 and 2012.119 Another plaintiff appears to
have filed nine lawsuits in 2006 and seven lawsuits in 2007. The fact that
these plaintiffs have a significant number of suits pending at once may
raise questions about their ability to monitor these suits.120
Second, several repeat plaintiffs appear to own a relatively small
number of shares in the companies they sue.121 This is not always the case;
some repeat plaintiffs own thousands of shares.122 In many cases, however,
the plaintiff appeared to own a fairly small number of shares in the target
corporation—as little as nine shares of stock.123
b. Alleged Payments to Plaintiffs
Repeat plaintiffs also raise concerns because of allegations that some
have been paid to participate in litigation, allegations that resemble those
from the pre-PSLRA period. One example can be found in Carrigan v.
Mr. Freberg as a plaintiff in the suit, holding that he “does in fact understand the basic nature of the
derivative claims brought in his name, even if barely so.” Id. at 134.
119. For a selection of these suits, see Coyne v. Morton’s Rest. Group, Inc., No. 7128 (Dec.
20, 2011); Verified Class Action Complaint, Coyne v. RightNow Techs., Inc., No. 6996 (Del. Ch.
Oct. 28, 2011).
120. See Egelhof v. Szulik, No. 04 CVS 11746, 2008 WL 352668, at *4 (N.C. Super. Ct. Feb.
4, 2008) aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds sub nom. Egelhof ex rel. Red Hat, Inc. v.
Szulik, 193 N.C. App. 612 (2008) (“While the size of ownership is not determinative of standing, a
potential plaintiff’s lack of a real financial stake in the litigation is a warning sign that he or she may
not be willing or able to devote the time necessary to fulfill the fiduciary obligations imposed by
law on a shareholder derivative plaintiff.”).
121. I am relying on a small sample of cases here because shareholder plaintiffs are generally
not required to disclose the number of shares that they own. Securities class actions are an
exception because the PSLRA requires plaintiffs to disclose “all of the transactions of the plaintiff
in the security that is the subject of the complaint during the class period specified in the
complaint.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(2)(A)(iv) (2006).
122. For example, Mr. Kahn, who is referenced above, alleged in a complaint challenging the
acquisition of 3Com Corporation that he owned 47,000 shares of stock in the company—a sizable
amount under any definition. Verified Class Action Complaint, Kahn v. 3Com Corp., No. 5087, at
2 (Del. Ch. Nov. 18, 2009); see also, e.g., Plaintiff Jean Marie Cinotto’s Declaration in Support of
Motion for Lead Plaintiff and Appointment of Lead Counsel, Cinotto v. Kavanaugh, No. 2:08-cv01998-CWH, at 3 (D.S.C. July 17, 2008) (alleging that plaintiff and her husband owned 10,000
shares in the target corporation).
123. E.g., Certification Pursuant to Federal Securities Laws, Ex. A to Shareholder Class Action
Complaint, Pinchuck v. Termeer, No. 1:10-cv-11776, at 4 (D. Mass. Oct. 18, 2010) (stating that
Mr. Pinchuck purchased 9 shares of stock in the target corporation during the class period); Mercier
v. Inter-Tel Inc., 929 A.2d 786, 788 (Del. Ch. 2007) (stating that Mr. Mercier owned 100 shares of
stock in the target corporation); Affidavit of Dan Himmel in Support of Moving Plaintiffs’ Motion
to Appoint Lead Plaintiff, Lead Counsel, and Liason Counsel, Himmel v. Borne, No. 3:10-cv00441-BAJ-SCR, at ¶ 3 (M.D. La. July 2, 2010) (stating that Mr. Himmel owned 101 shares of
stock in the target corporation).
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Solectron Corporation, a case filed in the Superior Court of California.124
In that case, the plaintiff Richard Carrigan challenged the proposed
acquisition of Solectron Corporation by Flextronics International Ltd.125
Mr. Carrigan may have business ties to Steven Staehr,126 the plaintiff who
together with a relative filed more shareholder suits than nearly anyone else
in my study.127 Mr. Carrigan was originally represented in the suit by the
same law firm that represented the Staehrs in many of their cases.128
Early in the litigation, the defendants suggested that Mr. Carrigan may
have been paid for his involvement in the litigation. In their answer, they
alleged that “[o]n information and belief, Richard Carrigan has received
improper personal benefits through this lawsuit or through his prior service
as a class representative in securities class action lawsuits or other
relationships with plaintiff’s counsel or their affiliates.”129
Later in the litigation, things changed. Mr. Carrigan became embroiled
in a disagreement with his former law firm. This split prompted Mr.
Carrigan to file a declaration in mid-2011 in which he alleged that his
former law firm had sought to protect Steven Staehr at the expense of the
shareholder class in the Solectron suit.130 In his declaration, Mr. Carrigan
stated explicitly that he had “personal knowledge” that the law firm had
paid Mr. Staehr “hundreds of thousands of dollars to act as a plaintiff in
over 30 cases.”131 In short, the defendants accused Mr. Carrigan of being
paid to serve in the Solectron lawsuit, and Mr. Carrigan accused Mr. Staehr
124. Complaint Based on Self-Dealing and Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Carrigan v. Solectron
Corporation, No. 1:07-cv-087219, at ¶ 1 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 4, 2007).
125. Id.
126. Mr. Carrigan and Mr. Staehr have invested in some of the same companies. By itself, this
would not mean much. But these companies appear to be quite small, with stock that was not
publicly traded at the time they originally invested, suggesting that the two may know each other.
See, e.g., Grant Enterprises, Inc., Amendment No. 6 to Form SB-2, Registration Statement under
the Securities Act of 1933, at 5–6 (Nov. 2, 2006) (disclosing that the company was controlled by
Mr. Carrigan and had a total of forty-one investors, including Mr. Carrigan and Mr. Staehr); Eastern
Services Holdings, Inc., Amendment No. 6 to Form SB-2, Registration Statement under the
Securities Act of 1933 (Sept. 20, 2006) (disclosing that Mr. Carrigan was the sole employee of the
main subsidiary of the company, which provides tax consultation to casinos, and that the company
had only forty-one shareholders at that time, including Mr. Carrigan and Mr. Staehr).
127. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
128. Compare Complaint Based upon Self-Dealing and Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Carrigan v.
Solectron Corporation, No. 1:07-cv-087219, at 15 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 4, 2007) (identifying
Robbins Umeda & Fink LLP as Mr. Carrigan’s counsel), with Docket, Staehr vs. Chizen, No. 1:06cv-072922 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 13, 2006) (identifying Robbins Umeda & Fink LLP as Mr. Staehr’s
counsel).
129. Defendants’ Amended Answer to Revised Third Amended Complaint, Carrigan v.
Solectron Corp., No. 1:07-cv-087219, at ¶ 60 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 14, 2009).
130. See id.
131. See Declaration of Richard Carrigan in Support of Plaintiff and Class Representative’s
Response to Court’s Order to Show Cause, Carrigan v. Solectron Corp., No. 1:07-cv-087219, at
¶¶ 1, 7 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 5, 2011).
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of being paid to serve in other lawsuits.132
The law firm vehemently denies both sets of allegations.133 In addition,
the context of the dispute raises questions about the accuracy of Mr.
Carrigan’s allegations. The law firm was in a dispute with the lawyer who
had been Mr. Carrigan’s contact at the firm, and there appears to have been
bad blood between the individuals involved. Nor did Mr. Carrigan explain
in his declaration how he knew about the alleged payments to Mr. Staehr
or offer supporting details. As a result, one cannot say with any certainty
whether such payments in fact occurred. The allegations, however,
certainly raise troubling questions.
On the other side of the country, another public fight between attorneys
has uncovered allegations of payments to plaintiffs. In 2011, two plaintiffs’
attorneys in New York sued a third plaintiffs’ attorney. The defendant was
allegedly a so-called referral attorney, an attorney who refers shareholder
plaintiffs to other lawyers who then perform much of the litigation work in
the suits.134 The lawsuit concerned, among other things, the payment of
these referral fees.135 During the legal battle, the plaintiffs alleged that the
referral attorney had, without their knowledge, “paid [an individual] with
the goal of inducing him to serve as a plaintiff.”136 The defendant denied
this allegation, but the parties dismissed the case before the court could
investigate these allegations.137 As in the Solectron litigation, it is
impossible to know whether this plaintiff was in fact paid for participating
in litigation, at least based on the public record alone. The point here is that
there were allegations that such payments occurred and there was no
judicial investigation of the allegations.
The two cases above allege direct payments to plaintiffs. Other cases
raise the possibility of indirect benefits. For example, some repeat
plaintiffs are attorneys themselves whose practices may depend in part on
referrals.138 Recall the Safety Kleen decision discussed above in Part I.139 In
that pre-PSLRA decision, the court denied the plaintiff David
Jaroslawicz’s motion to serve as class representative because he had served
as co-counsel in dozens of cases with class counsel Pomerantz Levy.140 In
other words, he was an inadequate class representative because he had a
132. See id.
133. See Telephone Interview with Craig W. Smith, Robbins Arroyo LLP (Feb. 22, 2013).
134. First Amended Complaint, Jacobs v. Harris, No. 650637/2011, at ¶ 14 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Apr. 22, 2011).
135. See id.at ¶ 29.
136. Id. at ¶ 10 (emphasis omitted).
137. See Dismissal Order with Prejudice, Jacobs et al. v. Harris, No. 650637/2011, at ¶ 3 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Sept. 6, 2011).
138. An even larger number of the plaintiffs are attorneys in shareholder lawsuits or related to
attorneys in shareholder lawsuits. These attorneys are discussed separately in the next section.
139. See supra pp. 8–9.
140. Jaroslawicz v. Safety Kleen Corp., 151 F.R.D. 324, 330 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
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significant business relationship with the law firm that was representing the
class.141
This decision was handed down nearly twenty years ago, but Mr.
Jaroslawicz continues to serve as a plaintiff in shareholder lawsuits.142
According to my research, he has served as a plaintiff in approximately a
dozen shareholder lawsuits over the last ten years.143 His counsel in many
of these suits is Pomerantz Haudek Grossman & Gross LLP,144 which
appears to be related to the firm that represented Mr. Jaroslawicz in the
Safety-Kleen litigation (Pomerantz Levy). It appears that Mr. Jaroslawicz
still serves as co-counsel with Pomerantz Haudek Grossman & Gross LLP
in other litigation.145 In other words, there is reason to believe that a
relationship similar to the one that concerned the court back in 1993 still
exists. As we shall see, the same can be said for other problems identified
in the pre-1995 period.
B. Lawyers and Their Families as Plaintiffs
A second category of professional plaintiffs involves the use of
plaintiffs’ attorneys and their families as plaintiffs. This Section presents
empirical data on the use of these plaintiffs and then turns to specific
examples that illustrate the phenomenon.
1. Empirical Data
To find plaintiffs’ attorneys who have served as plaintiffs, I first
141. Id.
142. For a sampling of these cases, see Summons, Jaroslawicz v. Transatlantic Holdings, Inc.,
No. 651718/2011 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 21, 2011); Jaroslawicz v. Hambrick, No. 1:1-cv-000886
(Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Apr. 6, 2011); Abramoff v. Pien, Case No. RG05232060 (Ca. Super. Ct. Sept.
12, 2005). In addition, a plaintiff who appears to be his wife has also filed multiple lawsuits. See,
e.g., Nadoff v. Medco Health Solutions, No. 2:11-cv-04248 (D.N.J. July 22, 2011); Nadoff (as
custodian for Michael Seth Jaroslawicz) v. Wolford, No. CGC-10-505737 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 1,
2010); Nadoff v. McDaniel, No. 08116438 (Dec. 9, 2008). In at least one of these suits, her
husband is listed as one of the attorneys representing the putative class. See, e.g., Complaint and
Demand for Jury Trial, Nadoff v. Medco Health Solutions, No. 2:11-cv-04248, at 20 (D.N.J. July
22, 2011) (listing David Jaroslawicz as an attorney).
143. See id.
144. See Complaint, Jaroslawicz v. Transatlantic Holdings, Inc., No. 651718/2011, at 18 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. June 21, 2011) (listing Pomerantz Haudek as counsel); Shareholder Class Action
Complaint, Jaroslawicz v. Lavin, No. 1:10-cv-06815, at 22 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 22, 2010). The firm is
now called Pomerantz Grossman Hufford Dahlstrom & Gross LLP.
145. See Class Action Complaint, Spataro v. Lincoln Nat’l Corp., No. 11-cv-2035, at 14
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2011) (ERISA class action complaint listing both Pomerantz Haudek Grossman
& Gross LLP and Jaroslawicz & Jaros LLC as counsel); Class Action Complaint, CLAL Finance
Mutual Fund Mgmt., Ltd. v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., No. 10-cv-8392, at 23 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5,
2010) (Commodity Exchange Act complaint listing same two firms, among others, as counsel);
Class Action Complaint, Randolph-Rand Corp. v. YKK Corp., No. 07-cv-10324–DC, at 18
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2007) (antitrust class action complaint listing same two firms as counsel).
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identified law firms that regularly represent plaintiffs in shareholder
litigation.146 I then searched for the names of the attorneys at these firms in
the Dockets database in Westlaw. This search revealed more than fifty
cases in which plaintiffs’ attorneys appear to have served as plaintiffs
between 2002 and 2012.147
Much more difficult is identifying plaintiffs’ lawyers’ family members
who have served as plaintiffs. Lawyers do not typically make their family
trees available online (with one notable exception described below). As a
result, I uncovered cases involving family members largely by chance.148
Still, my research reveals approximately fifty more shareholder lawsuits
since 2002 brought by plaintiffs who appear to be family members of
plaintiffs’ attorneys. Whether these suits are only a drop in a much larger
bucket is unclear. At a minimum, however, plaintiffs’ attorneys or family
members of plaintiffs’ attorneys appear to have filed more than 100
lawsuits since 2002.
Should this phenomenon disturb us? Some may argue that there is
nothing wrong with these attorneys or their family members serving as
plaintiffs. After all, attorneys can be victims of corporate misconduct, and
they should be able to use the legal system to redress their harms. Indeed,
plaintiffs’ attorneys are presumably more likely to recognize corporate
misconduct because they battle against it every day. And they are more
familiar with the litigation process and therefore may be able to provide
better oversight of the litigation.
Even so, there is reason to be skeptical. As courts have long recognized,
shareholder plaintiffs are supposed to serve as an independent check on the
litigation, ensuring that the lawsuit is in the best interests of the corporation
and its shareholders.149 It is obviously difficult to perform this role when
the attorney is one’s spouse or close family member.150 Similarly, an
attorney plaintiff who routinely works as co-counsel with the other
146. I generated this list through my own knowledge and research of this area. As with the
previous section, my goal was to explore the problem, not present a definitive count. As a result, the
actual scope of the problem may be greater than these figures reflect.
147. As in the previous Section, these plaintiffs played varied roles in the litigation. In some
instances, they served as the lead plaintiffs and therefore had a high degree of control over the
litigation. In other cases, they played smaller roles in the litigation.
148. In gathering the data on repeat plaintiffs described above, I often came across plaintiffs
whose last names I recognized. Using publicly available information, I was able to confirm whether
these plaintiffs were related to plaintiffs’ attorneys.
149. See, e.g., Stull v. Poole, 63 F.R.D. 702, 704 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
150. It is difficult to determine the precise details of the representations from the public record.
In some cases, the attorney relative serves as an attorney of record in the suit. In other cases,
however, the attorney relative is not listed as an attorney of record. In these cases, the exact
arrangements are unclear. If the attorney simply refers his relative to another lawyer with no
expectation of payment or future referrals, there may be no reason for concern. On the other hand, if
the attorney works on the suit but is not listed as counsel of record or if the attorney is compensated
through direct payments or the hope of future business, there may be greater reason for concern.
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attorneys in the litigation may be unwilling to jeopardize his business
relationships by taking a strong position in litigation. In short, these
attorney plaintiffs face possible conflicts of interest that may make it
difficult for them to properly represent absent class members.151
2. Illustrative Examples
Several examples illustrate this practice. The first involves a law firm
based in New York City called Paskowitz & Associates. Laurence
Paskowitz is the named partner at the firm, and he often serves as an
attorney in shareholder lawsuits.152 Over the last several years, however,
Mr. Paskowitz has also served as a plaintiff in multiple shareholder
lawsuits.153 Mr. Paskowitz is represented in some of these suits by an
attorney named Roy Jacobs.154 Mr. Jacobs’ office is on the same floor of
the same office building as Paskowitz & Associates,155 and Mr. Jacobs is
listed as part of Mr. Paskowitz’s firm in several court filings.156 In other
words, Mr. Paskowitz is both a plaintiffs’ lawyer and a plaintiff, often
represented by a close business associate.
For other attorneys, litigation is a family affair. Jules Brody is a partner
at Stull, Stull & Brody, a plaintiffs’ firm with offices in New York City
and California.157 Mr. Brody is married to Adele Brody,158 who has filed
151. This does not mean that any particular lawyer is an inadequate shareholder plaintiff. It
simply means that these plaintiffs may merit additional scrutiny. As discussed below, such scrutiny
rarely occurs.
152. See, e.g., LINKEDIN, http://www.linkedin.com/pub/laurence-paskowitz/9/720/795 (last
visited Oct. 1, 2012) (stating that he specializes in class actions, antitrust litigation, consumer fraud,
and complex business litigation and arbitration).
153. See, e.g., Class Action Complaint, Paskowitz v. Dayton Power & Light, No. 20:11-cv03103-GAB (Ohio Ct. C.P. Apr. 27, 2011); Complaint for Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Paskowitz v.
Zenith Nat’l Ins. Corp., No. BC432177 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 19, 2010); Complaint, Paskowitz v.
Pacific Capital Bancorp, No. 09-cv-6449 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2009); Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order, Paskowitz v. Toro, No. 2110-N (Del. Ch. Apr. 27, 2006). In my conversations
with Mr. Paskowitz, he stated that he was not the lead plaintiff in many of these cases. See Email to
Jessica Erickson from Laurence Paskowitz (Feb. 10, 2011) (on file with author).
154. See, e.g., Letter from Roy L. Jacobs to United States District Court, Paskowitz v. Pac.
Capital Bank Corp., No. 2:09-cv-6449 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2010) (identifying himself as one of Mr.
Paskowitz’s attorneys in the shareholder suit); Class Action Complaint, Paskowitz v. Looney, No.
1:07-cv-01053 (D. Col. May 18, 2007) (Mr. Jacobs identified as “of counsel” for Mr. Paskowitz).
155. See, e.g., Verified Shareholder Derivative Complaint, Delman v. Gifford, No. 11-cv6749, at 59 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2011) (stating, on the signature page, that both Mr. Paskowitz and
Mr. Jacobs work on the forty-sixth floor of 60 East 42nd Street in New York City).
156. See, e.g., Verified Class Action Complaint, Case No. 6090, DeHorn v. Soran, (Del. Ch.
Dec. 21, 2010), at 13; Berlin v. Wells Fargo Bank Nat’l Assoc., Case No. 09-6928 (C.D. Cal. Sept.
23, 2009), at 31. In my discussions with Mr. Paskowitz, he told me that they each own their own
law firms, but that Mr. Paskowitz hires Mr. Jacobs to serve as “of counsel” to Mr. Paskowitz’s firm
for particular cases. See Email to Jessica Erickson from Laurence Paskowitz (Feb. 10, 2011) (on file
with author).
157. See Brief Biography of Stull, Stull & Brody, at 17, http://www.ssbny.com/wp-
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multiple shareholder lawsuits over the past ten years.159 Indeed, Mrs. Brody
was identified as one of the “Most Frequently Named Plaintiffs” in a 2004
study of shareholder lawsuits filed in Delaware.160 This fact alone may
raise concerns, but my research suggests that multiple other members of
Mr. Brody’s family have filed shareholder lawsuits as well. I have included
below Mr. Brody’s family tree, which the family made public on the
Internet.161 The shaded boxes represent the individuals in his family who
have filed shareholder suits or other class action litigation.

As this figure illustrates, Mr. Brody’s wife, son, son-in-law, and daughterin-law appear to have served as plaintiffs in shareholder lawsuits or related
lawsuits.162 In addition, Mr. Brody’s wife Adele has apparently sued on

content/uploads/2012/03/SSBBio2-22-12.pdf.
158. See Marriage Announcement, Jules Brody to Marry Adele Nussbacher, N.Y. TIMES
Oct. 17, 1965, available at http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F60710FC3454177A93
C5A8178BD95F418685F9.
159. See, e.g., In re Hearst-Argyle Television, Inc., S’holders Litig., No. 3205-CC (Del. Ch.
Sept. 4, 2007); Brody v. Catell, No. 0008835/2006 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 19, 2006); Brody v.
Bellsouth Corp., No. 1:02-cv-02283 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 16, 2002).
160. Thompson & Thomas, supra note 94, at 188.
161. This genealogy information was available online. See Selected Families & Individuals,
http://www.rabbiyehudahyudelrosenberg.com/. When I contacted the law firm to confirm this
information, this portion of the website was taken down. A copy of the page that was taken down is
on file with the author.
162. Ms. Weisman appears to have served as a plaintiff in one or more antitrust class actions.
See Weisman v. Hearst Corp., No. 1:00-cv-05316 (S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2000); Weisman v. Nine West
Group, Inc., No. 7:99-cv-00394 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 1999).
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behalf of her mother’s estate in at least one lawsuit.163 She has also served
as the custodian for her two minor grandchildren in multiple lawsuits.164
The lawsuits involving the two grandchildren are interesting. I was able
to locate the complaints for two of these suits.165 Both suits appear to have
been filed when the children were less than five years old.166 The only
reference to their minor status that I could locate came in the certifications
attached at the end of the complaints where Adele Brody (their
grandmother) is identified as their custodian.167 Also notable is the fact
that, according to the certifications, the children owned only 100 shares of
stock in the defendant corporations.168 The certifications also disclosed that
the children were repeat litigants, having served or sought to serve as lead
plaintiffs in a total of six other lawsuits in the prior three years.169 In some
of these cases, one of the children appears to be represented by her family’s
law firm.170
Are these plaintiffs proper representatives of the class? The short
answer is that no one knows. As explained in greater detail below,171
defense attorneys and judges typically conduct remarkably little research
into the background of shareholder plaintiffs. As a result, they typically do
not notice that the plaintiff is a plaintiffs’ attorney or related to a plaintiffs’
attorney. In other words, it is difficult to know whether these plaintiffs are
proper class representatives because no one is asking the right questions.

163. Residuary Estate v. El Paso Corp., No. 4:02-cv-02838 (S.D. Tex. July 25, 2002).
164. See, e.g., Class Action Complaint for Violation of the Federal Securities Laws, Rubin v.
Am. Express, No. 1:02-cv-06440 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2002) [hereinafter American Express
Complaint]; Brody v. Bristol-Myers Squibb, No. 1:02-cv-2385 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2002); Class
Action Complaint for Violation of the Federal Securities Laws, Yaish v. Oracle Corp., No. 3:01-cv01237 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2001).
165. See Class Action Complaint for Violation of the Federal Securities Laws, Rubin v. Am.
Express Co., No. 1:02-cv-6440 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2002); Class Action Complaint for Violations
of Federal Securities Laws, Brody v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., No. 02-cv-2385 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27,
2002) [hereinafter Bristol Complaint].
166. According to the family’s website one of the grandchildren was born in 1999 and another
was born in 1998. See Selected Families & Individuals, supra note 161. The two cases in question
were filed in 2002.
167. See Bristol Complaint, Plaintiff Certification (attached at back); American Express
Complaint, Plaintiff Certification (attached at back). It is unclear why their grandmother, as
opposed to their parents, is listed as their custodian.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See, e.g., Smilow v. J.P. Morgan Chase, No. 1:02-cv-01910-SHS (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8,
2002) (indicating on the docket that the plaintiff was represented by Aaron, her father; and Jules
Brody, her grandfather); DeltaThree.com IPO v. DeltaThree.Com, Inc., No. 1:01-cv-05425
(S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2001) (indicating, on the docket, that the plaintiff was represented by Aaron, her
father; Tzivia, her aunt; and Jules Brody, her grandfather).
171. See discussion infra Subsection II.D.3.
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C. Entities as Plaintiffs
Institutional plaintiffs can fly under the judicial radar even more easily
than individuals can. It is remarkably easy to set up a corporation or other
business entity. 172 Plaintiffs who want to avoid scrutiny as repeat plaintiffs
can set up multiple companies and divide their investments among them.
This Section explores the possibility that attorneys may be using such
entities as plaintiffs. This Section does not include empirical data because
one cannot reach definitive conclusions about specific institutions based on
publicly available information. Instead, this Section relies largely on
illustrative examples.
1. Illustrative Examples
A recent case from the Delaware Court of Chancery, In re SS & C
Technologies, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, highlights the possibility that
individuals may have created entities at least in part to serve as plaintiffs in
shareholder lawsuits. The case was an acquisition class action arising out
of the sale of SS & C Technologies, Inc., brought by an institutional
plaintiff called Paulena Partners.173 During the litigation, counsel for the
plaintiffs informed the defendants that the complaint had incorrectly
identified Paulena Partners as the plaintiff, when in fact the actual SS&C
stockholder was another entity called Bamboo Partners.174 Both Paulena
Partners and Bamboo Partners were managed by a man named Dean
Drulias.175
This disclosure prompted the defendants to depose Mr. Drulias. During
the deposition, they learned that Mr. Drulias had had an interest in
numerous partnerships, as the Figure below illustrates.176

172. In most states, an individual only needs to file simple paperwork with the state and pay a
nominal fee. As a recent Reuters investigation found, many states even allow the real owners of
corporations to hide behind nominal officers and directors who have little or no role in the company
and who are often executives of the mass incorporator. See Kelly Carr & Brian Grow, Special
Report: A Little House of Secrets on the Great Plains, REUTERS, June 28, 2011, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/28/us-usa-shell-companies-idUSTRE75R20Z20110628.
Reuters uncovered, for example, a single house in Cheyenne, Wyoming, where more than 2000
companies are registered, serving as “a little Cayman Island on the Great Plains.” Id. The Reuters
investigation highlights how easy it is for individuals to hide behind corporate entities.
173. In re SS & C Techs., Inc. S’holders Litig., 948 A.2d 1140, 1142 (Del. Ch. 2008).
174. Id. at 1144.
175. Id.
176. Id. Some of the partnerships in this Figure were actually the same entity because, as Mr.
Drulias testified, he changed the name of these partnerships when he took over management of
them. Id. n.13.
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Each of these partnerships owned a few shares of stock in between sixty
and eighty public companies.177 According to the court, these interests
meant that “at any given time [Mr. Drulias had] a minuscule, indirect
interest in several hundred publicly traded companies.”178 In total, these
partnerships filed at least thirty shareholder class actions, although Mr.
Drulias could not remember the exact number in his deposition.179 He was
represented in many of these lawsuits by the Brualdi Law Firm, a repeat
player in the world of shareholder litigation.180
The court was extremely critical of these partnerships. It noted that Mr.
Drulias had made a number of false statements in court filings, and these
misstatements “are easily susceptible to the inference” that they were
intended to conceal a “web of partnerships.”181 The court also noted that
the purpose of these partnerships may have been to “spawn[]” litigation.182
The court held that these misstatements demonstrated a “pattern of, at best,
177.Id. at 1144.
178. Id. Bamboo Partnerships owned three shares of stock in SS & C. Id. Mr. Drulias testified
that he owned approximately 2% of these entities, often indirectly through other entities. He was
not asked who owned the remaining 98%, and there is no public information available on this point.
See id.
179. Id. at 1145.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
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carelessness, and at worst, a deliberate effort to mislead the court.”183 The
court then imposed sanctions on the plaintiff.184
2. Extent of These Practices
The SS&C example raises disturbing questions, but the critical issue is
whether the problems are more widespread. Limited to publicly available
information, it is impossible to know. Yet there is reason to wonder about
at least some plaintiffs in these suits.
First, we know remarkably little about many of the institutions that
serve as plaintiffs in shareholder litigation. A significant percentage of
shareholder suits are filed on behalf of institutions.185 Many of these
institutions are public pension or labor funds, but others are not. In my own
data set, there are a significant number of cases filed by institutions with
names suggesting that they may be private investment partnerships or
similar financial institutions. In researching these entities, I discovered that
little information is available about at least some of them. Most disclose
nothing about themselves in the court records.186 Many have no Internet
presence whatsoever. In some instances, the chief information available
online about the entities is the many lawsuits filed in their names.187 In an
era when Google can give us information about almost anything, some of
these entities appear to be invisible—except, that is, in the courtroom.
This is not to suggest that these entities are illegitimate. The law allows
private investment vehicles to remain largely private. Yet this invisibility
means that we know remarkably little about many of the institutions that
file shareholder suits, and in light of the SS & C decision, this lack of
knowledge may be problematic.
Moreover, no one appears to be investigating these entities. In
researching this Article, I spoke with numerous defense attorneys about
their experiences in shareholder litigation. They told me that they conduct
very little research about the named plaintiffs.188 In fact, unless they have a
183. Id. at 1151.
184. The court held that the plaintiff acted in bad faith during the litigation. It based this
decision in large part on the plaintiff’s motion to withdraw from the litigation without giving notice
to the class in order to keep the alleged issues with these partnerships private. Id. at 1151–52.
185. See, e.g., Erickson, supra note 21, at 1766–67 (finding that one-third of shareholder
derivative suits filed in federal court between mid-2005 and mid-2006 were filed by institutions).
186. Plaintiffs in shareholder lawsuits typically disclose only their names, the fact that they
owned stock in the target corporation during the time in question, and (if necessary for diversity
jurisdiction) their states of citizenship. Other details—such as the general nature of their businesses
or the names of their owners—are not disclosed until discovery. If the case does not get to
discovery (and most do not), this information may never be disclosed. See id. at 1765.
187. This discussion does not identify specific entities because it is impossible to tell from the
public record whether specific entities are legitimate. The purpose of this discussion is instead to
highlight broader questions about the use of institutions as plaintiffs.
188. This point is illustrated by the SS & C litigation itself. No one would have ever known
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specific reason to suspect misconduct or the case is quite significant, they
typically conduct “zero” investigation into these plaintiffs.189
Why do defense attorneys fail to ask even the most basic questions
about these plaintiffs? Defense attorneys told me that this decision stems
from two considerations. First, and most importantly, professional
plaintiffs often appear in acquisition class actions, and these suits move
extremely quickly. There are often only a few months between the filing of
the litigation and the scheduled closing of the merger. During this brief
window, defense attorneys devote all of their energies to ensuring that the
merger closes on schedule. As a result, they often focus on litigation
strategies that will lead to a quick settlement or a blanket dismissal.
Challenging the adequacy of the plaintiff is unlikely to accomplish either
goal, at least in the eyes of defense attorneys.190
Second, defense attorneys may be naïve about the identity of
shareholder plaintiffs. They might suspect that plaintiffs may own only a
few shares of stock in the target corporation or may not know much about
the underlying litigation, but the defense attorneys do not think that there
are more serious problems. Their beliefs may even be self-perpetuating.
Defense attorneys do not research plaintiffs because they do not think they
will find anything useful, and they do not think they will find anything
useful because they have never researched the plaintiffs. In short, we do
not know what types of entities serve as plaintiffs in shareholder litigation
because no one is asking the question.
D. Dead Plaintiffs and Other Problems from the Filing Graveyard
The problems outlined above are quite reminiscent of the problems that
preceded the PSLRA. My research suggests, however, that new problems
may have emerged in the wake of the PSLRA. This Section highlights
three new types of alleged problems relating to the plaintiffs in shareholder
litigation: (1) plaintiffs who may have died during the litigation, (2)
plaintiffs who may not have owned the required stock during the litigation,
and (3) plaintiffs who may not have known that they were plaintiffs. As
with the prior Section, limited to allegations in the public record, it is not
possible to present empirical data showing how often these problems have
occurred. Thus, the discussion below relies on illustrative allegations to
that Dean Drulias was associated with entities involved in approximately thirty lawsuits if he had
not accidentally offered up the wrong entity as the plaintiff.
189. These attorneys often conduct more research in higher-profile or higher-dollar value
cases. As discussed further in Part III, these cases are different than the more typical cases that are
the focus of this Article.
190. These attorneys may believe that plaintiffs’ attorneys will merely substitute a new plaintiff
if the original plaintiff comes under fire. This belief may not always be correct, because the
plaintiffs’ attorney may not be able to find another shareholder willing to serve as a plaintiff in the
suit. In many suits, however, there is more than one plaintiff, and therefore disqualifying one
plaintiff would not eliminate the entire suit.
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raise broader questions about the practices in these suits.
1. Dead Plaintiffs
In at least two cases, litigation may have continued for several months
after the death of the shareholder plaintiff. The first case is a shareholder
derivative suit filed by a shareholder named Maxine Babus on November
3, 2006.191 This lawsuit, which was filed on behalf of Loral Space &
Communications Inc. in New York state court, alleged that the Loral board
breached its fiduciary duties in connection with the sale of $300 million of
preferred stock.192 On March 21, 2007, months after the suit was filed, the
parties entered into a Memorandum of Understanding in which the
purchaser of the preferred stock agreed to pay Loral to settle the
litigation.193
On April 27, 2007, according to the company’s public filings, the
plaintiffs in a parallel Delaware suit filed a motion to intervene in the New
York suit.194 In this motion, the interveners told the court that the New
York shareholder plaintiff, Maxine Babus, had died on November 12,
2006, just days after the suit was filed.195 According to these court filings,
the attorneys were ready to settle the case even though they did not have a
named plaintiff.
My research uncovered another case in which the plaintiff’s death may
not have been disclosed to the court for several months. In Orton v. Brown,
the plaintiff, J. Robert Orton Jr., filed a shareholder derivative suit on
behalf of MBIA Inc. in the Southern District of New York.196 The suit was
filed on April 24, 2006.197 More than a year later, on May 1, 2007, the
defendants filed a Suggestion of Death informing the court that the
plaintiff had died.198 No additional information was provided, and the suit
was voluntarily dismissed several months later.199 My own research
suggests that Mr. Orton may have died in May 2006, approximately two
weeks after the suit was filed.200 If this research is correct, Mr. Orton’s
191. See Babus v. Targoff, No. 603842/2006 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 3, 2006).
192. See Shareholder Derivative Complaint, Babus v. Targoff, No. 603842/2006 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. Nov. 3, 2006).
193. See Loral Space & Commc’ns Inc., Form 10-Q, at 27 (for the quarterly period that ended
Sept. 30, 2007).
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Orton v. Brown, No. 1:06-cv-03146 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2006).
197. Id.
198. See Suggestion of Death Upon the Record, Orton v. Brown, No. 1:06-cv-03146
(S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2007).
199. See Stipulation and Order of Dismissal, Orton v. Brown, No. 1:06-cv-03146-LLS
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2007).
200. See Social Security Death Index for J. Robert Orton, ANCESTRY.COM,
http://www.ancestry.com (last visited Nov. 19, 2012) (stating that he died on May 10, 2006). This
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death was not brought to the court’s attention for nearly twelve months,.201
A dead plaintiff is obviously unable to serve as an advocate for the
plaintiff corporation or absent class members. One could say the same
about other plaintiffs who do not meet the basic qualifications to file these
suits.
2. Plaintiffs Who May Not Own Stock
Plaintiffs lack standing to file shareholder litigation if they do not own
the required stock in the target corporation. In shareholder derivative suits,
a shareholder is only permitted to file suit on behalf of the plaintiff
corporation if the shareholder owned stock in the target corporation at the
time of the alleged misconduct and continued to hold this stock throughout
the litigation.202 This requirement is based in large part on the principle
that derivative plaintiffs represent the company, and therefore should have
financial interests that are aligned with the company’s interests.203
Some plaintiffs, however, may have filed derivative suits even though
they could not comply with this basic requirement. In Parfi Holding AB v.
Mirror Image Internet, Inc.,204 for example, the court discovered that two
of the plaintiffs no longer held stock in the plaintiff corporation.205 Indeed,
one of the plaintiffs had divested its stock in the plaintiff corporation
nearly six years earlier, before the litigation was even filed.206 The
plaintiff’s counsel may have ignored this fact or failed to inquire whether
the plaintiff met the requirements to serve as a derivative plaintiff.
This problem may be more widespread. Shareholders in derivative
suits must allege continuous stock ownership from the time of the alleged
misconduct through the conclusion of the suit. Shareholders often satisfy
this pleading requirement by alleging that they are and were, “at all
relevant times,” a shareholder of the plaintiff corporation.207 In many suits,
however, the allegations are slightly different. Instead of alleging that the
obituary does not specify that this decedent was J. Robert Orton Jr., although other information
suggests that he was. See, e.g., Obituary, Robert Orton Jr., CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, May 23, 2006
(referencing the death of J. Robert Orton Jr. in La Jolla, California on May 10, 2006).
201. See, e.g., Memo. of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss, Orton v. Brown, No. 1:06-cv03146 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 2006); Plaintiff’s Initial Disclosures Pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a),
Orton v. Brown, No. 1:06-cv-03146 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2007).
202. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 327 (2011).
203. See Parfi Holding AB v. Mirror Image Internet, Inc., 954 A.2d 911, 939 (Del. Ch. 2008).
204. Id.
205. Id. at 935–38.
206. Id. at 935.
207. See, e.g., Shareholder Derivative Complaint, Salzman v. Bartz, No. 11-cv-03269, at ¶ 18
(N.D. Cal. July 1, 2011). Many courts have required the plaintiff to go even further; they have
required the plaintiff to specifically identify when he or shepurchased stock in the plaintiff
corporation and whether he or she continues to own this stock. See, e.g., In re VeriSign, Inc.,
Derivative Litig., 531 F. Supp. 2d 1173, 1202 (N.D. Cal. 2007).

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol65/iss4/2

34

Erickson: The New Professional Plaintiffs in Shareholder Litigation

2013]

THE NEW PROFESSSIONAL PLAINTIFFS IN SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION

1123

plaintiff owned stock “at all relevant times”208 to the litigation or providing
the details of their stock purchases and sales, plaintiffs often allege only
that they owned stock “at times relevant” to the litigation.209This difference
may simply reflect a drafting choice, but given Parfi Holding, there is
certainly an argument that more should be done to confirm the plaintiff’s
stock holdings in derivative litigation.
3. Plaintiffs Who May Not Know They Are Plaintiffs
Among the most troubling allegations are those regarding plaintiffs who
may not know they are plaintiffs. One recent lawsuit raises the possibility
that a lawsuit may have been filed on a plaintiff’s behalf without her
knowledge or consent. In this 2010 lawsuit, two plaintiffs’ attorneys in
New York City filed a lawsuit against a referral attorney who they alleged
“supplied” them with a plaintiff who had not consented to participate in the
litigation.210 Not knowing about the plaintiff’s lack of consent, the
attorneys filed suit on the plaintiff’s behalf in federal court.211 Following
the filing of the case, a reporter allegedly located the plaintiff and phoned
her for comment.212 The complaint alleges that the plaintiff then “learned
that [the referral attorney] had volunteered her to serve as a plaintiff
without her knowledge.”213 The suit was subsequently dismissed. The
attorneys note that the referral attorney’s alleged “strategy would ‘work’ in
the vast majority of derivative cases, as the named plaintiff is only rarely
subjected to any sort of personal discovery.”214 Had the reporter not
contacted the plaintiff, it is certainly possible that the suit would have
continued without the knowledge or participation of a named plaintiff.
How often do such problems occur? When it comes to professional
plaintiffs, empirical evidence is hard to come by. Anecdotal evidence sheds
light on this corner of the legal system, but attorneys and judges are not
asking the tough questions that could lead to broader insights. As a result,
we do not know how often shareholders are being paid to participate in
litigation. We do not know how often plaintiffs’ lawyers are serving as
plaintiffs themselves. We do not know if institutional plaintiffs are
legitimate entities. We do not even know if plaintiffs are named in
208. Shareholder Derivative Complaint, supra note 207.
209. A search of the pleadings database in Westlaw reveals some of these complaints. For
example, a search for “derivative & (plaintiff /15 (owner or holder) /15 (stock or shares) /15 “at
times relevant”)” brings up more than 300 examples of this type of language in derivative
complaints. It is impossible to determine from the public record which of these plaintiffs, if any, fail
to satisfy the standing requirements.
210. See First Amended Complaint, Jacobs v. Harris, No. 650637/2011, at ¶ 18 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Apr. 22, 2011).
211. Id.
212. Id. ¶ 19.
213. Id.
214. Id. ¶ 18.
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litigation without their knowledge. In all of these instances, no one ever
bothers to check. And because no one ever bothers to check, there is a
window of opportunity for unscrupulous lawyers who are willing to skirt
the rules to procure a client.
III. TOWARD A NEW PROFESSIONALISM IN SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION
In corporate law, it seems, the more things change, the more they stay
the same. Many of the exact practices that Congress targeted in the 1990s
may be continuing in the state courts. As these practices are exposed,
lawmakers must again confront the theoretical questions that accompany
these practices. When Congress passed the PSLRA, many commentators
asked whether professional plaintiffs hurt anyone215—a question that is
still critical today. This Part explains why the new professional plaintiffs
are bad for corporate law. The discussion begins by exploring the ethical
implications of professional plaintiffs. It then shifts to a broader
examination of the impact of professional plaintiffs on investors and
entrepreneurial litigation more generally. Finally, this Part considers new
legislative proposals to address the problem of professional plaintiffs.
A. The Problems with the New Professional Plaintiffs
1. Lax Ethics
The allegations outlined in Part II are undoubtedly troubling and
perhaps even scandalous. Few would argue in favor of a legal system in
which lawyers surreptitiously pay plaintiffs to lend their names to litigation
or sue on behalf of their family members. Beyond the shock value,
however, some of the allegations in Part II may implicate the ethical rules
that govern the practice of law.216 The use of professional plaintiffs may
raise two specific ethical concerns.
First, ethics rules prohibit payments to shareholder plaintiffs beyond
their pro rata share of the recovery and reimbursement of reasonable
expenses. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules)
provide that a lawyer may not share legal fees with a nonlawyer except in
certain narrow circumstances.217 A lawyer also cannot provide financial
215. This was a common question, for example, in the wake of the Milberg Weiss indictments
when the government alleged that the law firm had paid plaintiffs. See, e.g., Lonny Hoffman & Alan
F. Steinberg, The Ongoing Milberg Weiss Controversy, 30 REV. LITIG. 183, 186 (2011) (“The single
greatest source of controversy surrounding the Milberg prosecution, however, has always been
whether anyone was actually harmed by what the lawyers did.”).
216. This discussion is meant to highlight possible ethical problems with the use of
professional plaintiffs. It does not mean that any attorneys have violated their ethical obligations,
much less that any particular attorneys have violated their ethical obligations. Such a determination
would depend on the specific facts in each case, many of which are not available from the public
record.
217. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4. These rules do not prohibit payments that
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assistance to a client in connection with pending or contemplated
litigation.218 In short, if attorneys are paying plaintiffs to participate in
litigation, they may be violating their ethical obligations.219
Second, ethical issues arise if attorneys make false statements to the
court. The Model Rules provide that an attorney may not make a false
statement of fact or law to the court.220 Depending on their precise
representations to the court, attorneys may violate this rule when they
represent professional plaintiffs.
These ethical concerns about the use of professional plaintiffs have a
critical impact on the application of class action law. The legal system
requires judges to determine whether the proposed class representative is
an adequate representative of the class.221 In a shareholder lawsuit, this
determination depends in large part on whether the named plaintiffs have
interests that conflict with the interests of other class members.222 Such a
conflict impedes the ability of plaintiffs to perform their “most important
task”—selecting and supervising class counsel to ensure that they are
acting in accordance with the interests of the class.223
The use of professional plaintiffs has direct implications under the laws
governing class actions. If plaintiffs have been paid to participate in
litigation, for example, their interests likely diverge from the interests of
the class. These plaintiffs may be more concerned with protecting their
side payments than with maximizing the recovery to the class, especially if
the side payments exceed the plaintiffs’ likely recovery in the litigation.224
These concerns would take on even more significance if the plaintiff is
dead, nonexistent, or does not know that he or she has been named in the
suit.
Despite these concerns, the law lacks an effective mechanism to enforce
existing rules. It is theoretically possible for lawyers to be disbarred for
violating their ethical obligations, but in most cases this possibility is
merely theoretical. Lawyers typically only face ethics proceedings if the
alleged violation is referred to the state bar association. Named plaintiffs
are unlikely to make such a referral, especially if they are being paid for
compensate plaintiffs for their expenses in the litigation.
218. Id. R. 1.8(e).
219. These payments may also violate federal law. See 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2006) (making it a
criminal offense to “corruptly demand[], seek[], receive[], accept[], or agree[] to receive or accept
anything of value . . . in return for being influenced in testimony under oath or affirmation as a
witness”).
220. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(1).
221. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4). A similar requirement applies to shareholder derivative suits
under Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
222. See, e.g., In re Am. Int’l Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 265 F.R.D. 157, 172 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
223. Gill v. Monroe Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 92 F.R.D. 14, 16 (W.D.N.Y. 1981).
224. A similar concern arises if class counsel uses his or her family members or business
associates as plaintiffs.
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their cooperation or are related to class counsel. The defendant could refer
a case to disciplinary authorities, but as discussed above, defendants
typically conduct little or no investigation into the shareholder plaintiff.
Moreover, the defendant may prefer an inadequate plaintiff because it may
be able to bargain for a lower settlement if the plaintiff is vulnerable to
challenge.
Absent the plaintiff or the defendant raising these ethical issues, the
court is unlikely to discover them. Few courts conduct their own inquiries
into the background of the named plaintiffs, at least beyond a few cursory
questions directed at counsel. Issues may arise through mere happenstance
during the course of the litigation, as in many of the allegations discussed
in Part II, but most cases will escape judicial scrutiny.225
This analysis does not mean that defendants never contest the
qualifications of the named plaintiff. In larger cases with significant money
at stake, the defendant has a greater incentive to oppose class certification
by investigating the named plaintiff’s qualifications. As discussed in the
next Section, however, the problems identified in this Article do not
typically arise in these larger cases. Instead, these problems arise more
often in the run-of-the-mill cases that settle at minimal cost to the
defendants. In these cases, defendants have little incentive to challenge the
adequacy of the plaintiff and the court has little incentive to delay the
settlement by conducting its own investigation.226
In sum, ethical and other rules may prohibit many of the practices
associated with professional plaintiffs. The problem is that there is not an
effective means to enforce these rules. As we shall see, without a means to
enforce these rules, there is no one at the settlement table to protect the
interests of absent class members.
2. Missing Monitors
Plaintiffs have always occupied an uneasy role in entrepreneurial
litigation. On one hand, attorneys cannot file a shareholder derivative suit
or acquisition class action without a named plaintiff.227 On the other hand,
225. The same problems come into play during class certification. In the vast majority of cases,
the court does not certify the class until after the parties have reached a settlement. In the settlement
documents, the parties typically agree that the named plaintiff is an adequate representative and that
the case otherwise satisfied the requirements of Rule 23. The prevalence of these settlement-only
classes means that most named plaintiffs are never subjected to the scrutiny of the class action
process.
226. Macey & Miller, supra note 19, at 64 (“The defendant is unlikely to challenge the named
plaintiff’s typicality or adequacy, even when such a challenge might be successful, if the defendant
believes that counsel representing this particular individual is someone who is likely to cut a
favorable deal in settlement.”).
227. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Incentive Awards to Class Action
Plaintiffs: An Empirical Study, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1303, 1305 (2006) (“The named plaintiff remains
an essential prerequisite in all class cases.”).
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few people think these plaintiffs matter very much, as reflected in the wellaccepted belief that shareholder plaintiffs are “figurehead[s],”228
“pawns,”229 and a “necessary nuisance.”230 In other words, shareholder
plaintiffs hold the keys to the courthouse doors, but often do little once
these doors have been opened. Given this nominal role, why should we
care about professional plaintiffs? After all, if plaintiffs do not matter,
maybe professional plaintiffs do not matter. As we shall see, however,
plaintiffs do matter. Plaintiffs have the potential to play a crucial role in
preventing collusive settlements. This Subsection explains how the rise of
professional plaintiffs may undermine the ability of shareholders to
monitor their attorneys and protect absent class members.
a. The Need for a Monitor at the Settlement Table
If judges expect so little from plaintiffs, why does the legal system still
require them? This section argues that the rule requiring plaintiffs is not an
anachronism from the legal past. Instead, it reflects modern economic
theory regarding the incentives in shareholder litigation.
As discussed in Part I, the contingency fee system creates incentives for
plaintiffs’ attorneys to protect the interests of absent class members.231
Attorneys work hard on behalf of the class because they ultimately get a
percentage of any settlement or judgment. If these incentives work,
figurehead plaintiffs—and by extension, professional plaintiffs—are not
problematic, because plaintiffs’ attorneys stand ready and willing to fight
for larger settlements on the entire class’s behalf.
As discussed in Part I, however, plaintiffs’ attorneys have incentives
that often cause them to underinvest in certain types of shareholder
litigation and overinvest in others.232 In securities class actions in the
1990s, attorneys overinvested in litigation because companies were
agreeing to settle even arguably frivolous claims in order to avoid high
discovery costs and the risk of catastrophic jury awards.233 In shareholder
suits filed under state law, attorneys may similarly overinvest in litigation,
but for different reasons.
Commentators have long believed that attorneys are overinvesting in
state shareholder suits. In the early 1990s, for example, one study
concluded that “shareholder litigation is a weak, if not ineffective,
instrument of corporate governance” and “the principal beneficiaries of

228. In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 404 F.3d 173, 191 (3d Cir. 2005).
229. Mars Steel Corp. v. Cont’l Ill. Nat’l Bank & Trust, 834 F.2d 677, 681 (7th Cir. 1987).
230. Declaration of Michael Hartlieb, Carrigan v. Solectron Corp., No. 1:07-cv-087219 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Aug. 5, 2011).
231. See discussion supra Section I.B.
232. See supra note 66.
233. See discussion supra Section I.B.
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cash payouts in shareholder suits are attorneys.”234 More recent studies
show that these problems have persisted. In 2011 alone, shareholders
challenged ninety-six percent of acquisitions involving U.S. public
companies valued at over $500 million.235 This figure strongly suggests
that plaintiffs’ attorneys are reflexively filing many shareholder suits.
The overinvestment in these suits arises in large part because of what
economists call non-zero sum settlements.236 Most settlements are zerosum negotiations—every dollar in the plaintiff’s pocket equals a dollar out
of the defendant’s pocket. In many shareholder lawsuits, however, the
parties at the settlement table can reach settlements that benefit the
plaintiffs’ attorney without the defendant incurring any significant loss.237
These non-zero sum settlements give plaintiffs’ attorneys an incentive to
file frivolous suits and defendants an incentive not to fight them.238
Non-zero sum settlements are common in shareholder litigation, often
including nonmonetary benefits for the plaintiffs combined with significant
fees for the attorneys. Many acquisition class actions routinely end with
disclosure-based settlements in which the corporation agrees to make
additional disclosures regarding the acquisition in exchange for settling the
suit.239 Similarly, shareholder derivative suits frequently end with the
corporation agreeing to make arguably cosmetic changes to its corporate
governance practices in exchange for dismissal of the suit.240 The
attorneys’ fees in these types of cases are often significant, with one study
finding that the plaintiffs’ attorneys in acquisition class actions make
nearly $500 per hour in suits involving nonmonetary settlements.241
Attorneys can often achieve a similar result in settlements that do
include a monetary component. Many acquisition class actions are filed
soon after the initial announcement of the deal. These complaints typically
allege that the offer is too low. Following this initial offer, however, the
prospective purchaser and the target’s board often continue negotiations,
234. See Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation without Foundation?, 7 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 55, 65, 84 (1991).
235. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION
INVOLVING MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 2. This percentage is up from 53% just a few years earlier.
Id. Nor are these suits limited to the very largest deals. Ninety-one percent of the deals valued at
over $100 million were challenged in 2011. Id. at 3.
236. See Coffee, supra note 20, at 23.
237. Settlements can benefit the plaintiffs even if the defendant does not incur a significant
loss. The concern here is that plaintiffs’ attorneys and defendants are too quick to agree to
settlements that do not benefit shareholders in large part because the settlements are so cheap for
defendants.
238. Of course, not all suits filed by professional plaintiffs end with such settlements. My point
relates more broadly to the incentives in these lawsuits.
239. See Weiss & White, supra note 16, at 1830 (describing empirical data about settlements
in acquisition class actions).
240. See Erickson, supra note 21, at 1823–24.
241. See Weiss & White, supra note 16, at 1830.
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which can lead to a higher final price. It is relatively easy for plaintiffs’
attorneys to file suit immediately after the initial announcement of the
offer, wait for the parties to negotiate a higher price or amended deal terms,
and then take credit for the changes.242 The Delaware Court of Chancery
has criticized these settlements, stating that they can be little more than a
“Kabuki dance.”243 Despite this criticism, however, these settlements
remain a cheap form of currency in shareholder suits.244
These settlements are not surprising given the incentives in these suits.
Non-zero sum settlements benefit defendants who can buy a release at a
nominal cost. They also benefit plaintiffs’ attorneys who get significant
fees for relatively little effort. The only people who do not benefit from
these settlements are shareholders—the real parties in interest in these
suits. These settlements occur because no one at the settlement table is
protecting shareholder interests. In other words, the legal system is missing
a crucial monitor at the settlement table.
These settlements do not just hurt the shareholders of the particular
company targeted in the lawsuit. They also undermine the role of private
litigation in deterring corporate fraud. Corporate wrongdoers have little to
fear from litigation if they know that they can escape significant monetary
liability by agreeing to a nonmonetary settlement and high attorneys’ fees.
In short, the fact that we are missing a monitor at the settlement table not
only leads to problematic settlements—it also undermines the deterrent
role of shareholder litigation.
b. The Role of Shareholders Versus Other Monitors
If the current incentives in shareholder litigation lead to problematic
settlements, the question becomes how to stop these settlements. As we
will see, shareholders play a critical role in stopping problematic
settlements, but this role is undermined by the continued presence of
professional plaintiffs. To understand this role, however, we must first
examine alternative proposals to address the incentive problems in
242. The Delaware Court of Chancery has analyzed these settlement dynamics in a number of
decisions. See, e.g., In re Cox Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 621 (Del. 2005).
243. In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 945 (Del. 2010). A Kabuki dance is an
event “that looks to have an uncertain outcome but actually comes to a conclusion the participants
have scripted in advance.” See State v. Bowser, 266 P.3d 1253, at *4 (2012).
244. Concerns about professional plaintiffs are bolstered by the research of Professor Michael
Perino, who examined whether the cases named in the Milberg Weiss indictments ended differently
than other comparable cases. See Michael A. Perino, The Milberg Weiss Prosecution: No Harm. No
Foul?, 11 Briefly iii (May 2008), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract _id=1133995. He
found a statistically significant difference in the attorneys’ fees between the cases named in the
indictment and other comparable cases. Id. at 39–58. This difference was modest, and Professor
Perino found no difference in the overall size of the settlements, so his findings should not be
overstated. But his research does suggest that investors suffer in cases where the named plaintiff has
a financial interest adverse to the interests of the class.
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shareholder litigation. Scholars have put forth at least two types of
proposals to address these problems: (1) those that rely on the watchful eye
of judges, and (2) those that rely on altered economic incentives for
plaintiffs’ attorneys.
Many commentators have pinned their hopes on more effective
oversight by judges.245 If judges routinely rejected cosmetic settlements
and exercised more careful oversight of plaintiffs’ attorneys, they could
prevent collusion in shareholder suits. In a series of recent opinions, the
Delaware Court of Chancery has endorsed this approach.246 The court has
made clear that it will closely examine settlement terms, rejecting those
that benefit attorneys at the expense of shareholders.247 In my discussions
with members of the Delaware bar, several observed that these efforts have
started to change the state of play in Delaware. For example, parties may
be more reluctant to agree to nonmonetary settlements. They may also
conduct more confirmatory discovery before presenting settlements to the
court. In sum, Delaware courts are looking harder at these cases, and this
scrutiny may be changing how lawyers litigate.
Will the changes in Delaware change shareholder litigation more
generally? There is some reason to doubt that they will. Even if Delaware
is eager to perform this gatekeeping function, other courts may not be.
Over the last several years, plaintiffs’ attorneys have increasingly started to
file lawsuits outside Delaware.248 Indeed, of the cases filed by repeat
plaintiffs in my study, less than one-quarter were filed in Delaware.249 The
rest were filed in other state and federal courts across the country. Even if
we trust Delaware judges to root out professional plaintiffs, we may not
have the same confidence in judges in other jurisdictions. This observation
is not meant as a criticism of these judges. Delaware judges are uniquely
situated to take an active role in shareholder litigation because they see
these cases day in and day out. Judges in other jurisdictions may simply not
245. See, e.g., Chris Brummer, Sharpening the Sword: Class Certification, Appellate Review,
and The Role of the Fiduciary Judge in Class Action Lawsuits, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1042, 1043
(2004); Alexandra Lahav, Fundamental Principles for Class Action Governance, 37 IND. L. REV.
65, 136–38 (2003); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Judicial Review of Class Action
Settlements, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 167, 193 (2009) (establishing a sliding scale for judicial oversight
of class action settlements).
246. See, e.g., In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d at 956; In re Del Monte Foods Co.
S’holders Litig., 2010 WL 5550677, at *9–11 (Del. Ch. Dec. 31, 2010).
247. For example, the court has noted that law firms can “build (and sometimes burn)
reputational capital with the Court” and stated that it will replace plaintiffs’ attorneys who fail to
protect the interests of absent class members. In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d at 955–
56.
248. See Bernard Black et al., Is Delaware Losing Its Cases?, at 1,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1578404.
249. Specifically, 23.2% were filed in the Delaware Court of Chancery. The cases that were
filed in federal court typically relied on diversity jurisdiction, although the complaints occasionally
included federal question claims as well.
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know to be on the lookout for professional plaintiffs, problematic
settlements, or any of the other potential problems in these cases.
Delaware is trying to solve the problem of multi-forum litigation, an
effort that may have implications for professional plaintiffs. In a 2010
decision, Delaware Court of Chancery Vice Chancellor J. Travis Laster
invited corporations to adopt provisions specifying the Delaware courts as
the “exclusive forum for intra-entity disputes.”250 More than eighty
companies have taken up this invitation, adopting exclusive forum
provisions in either their charters or bylaws.251 The legal validity of these
provisions is uncertain—they are currently under challenge in the courts,252
and at least one judge has refused to apply them.253
The research on professional plaintiffs provides an additional reason to
enforce these provisions. As discussed above, Delaware is uniquely
situated to address the problem of professional plaintiffs. Moreover, judges
would be better able to recognize professional plaintiffs if shareholder
lawsuits were all filed in a single court. Yet, these provisions are not a
cure-all. Even if they survive legal challenge, they may not bring all
professional plaintiffs to the attention of the court. Moreover, even
Delaware does not have a perfect record when it comes to identifying these
plaintiffs.254
Many scholars have instead advocated reforms that change the
incentives for plaintiffs’ attorneys. As just one example, some scholars
have argued that courts should use an auction system in which plaintiffs’
attorneys bid for the right to control the litigation.255 Any proceeds from
the auction would be distributed to the class.256 The winning bidder would
then keep the entire recovery in the litigation.257 This proposal garnered
250. In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d at 960.
251. See Claudia H. Allen, Study of Delaware Forum Selection in Charters and Bylaws, at
ii, http://www.ngelaw.com/files/Publication/4050bc71-8f96-4442-9ed1-8ce7fc59716d/Presentation/
PublicationAttachment/411832b1-153c-4d49-9dd4-b4e16548082f/Exclusive_Forum_Provisions_S
tudy_4_7_11.pdf.
252. See, e.g., Verified Complaint, iClub Inv. P’ship v. FedEx Corp., No. 7238, 2012 WL
467504, at ¶ 1 (Del. Ch. Feb. 13, 2012); Verified Complaint, Neighbors v. Air Prods. & Chems.,
Inc., No. 7240, 2012 WL 467520, at ¶ 1 (Del. Ch. Feb. 13, 2012); Verified Complaint,
Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., No. 7219, 2012 WL 381849, at ¶ 1
(Del. Ch. Feb. 6, 2012).
253. See Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1174–75 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
254. The lawsuits filed by the entities associated with Dean Drulias discussed in Section II.C
illustrate this point. These entities filed multiple lawsuits in the Delaware Court of Chancery before
anyone noticed the potential problems. Moreover, the court would likely not have learned about the
connection between these partnerships if Mr. Drulias had not mistakenly identified the wrong
partnership in his original complaint. In short, even the Delaware Court of Chancery did not notice
these potential problems until they became almost too obvious to miss.
255. See, e.g., Macey & Miller, supra note 19, at 6.
256. Id. at 106–08.
257. See id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013

43

Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 4 [2013], Art. 2

1132

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

significant attention initially, and a few courts experimented with it,258 but
ultimately lawmakers have been unable to structure an auction model that
solves the problems inherent in shareholder litigation.259 As Professor
Coffee has noted, the limitations of such proposals “suggest that the legal
system cannot pin all its hopes on the attorneys’ fee award as the optimal
incentive device.”260
The intractability of these problems suggests that we should not be so
quick to write off the plaintiffs in shareholder lawsuits. If judges cannot
protect plaintiffs and attorneys cannot protect plaintiffs, maybe plaintiffs
can protect plaintiffs.
The law is increasingly moving in this direction. The PSLRA, for
example, is based on the idea that plaintiffs matter. By granting control of
the litigation to the shareholder with the greatest financial stake, Congress
made clear that shareholder plaintiffs have a crucial role to play in
securities class actions.261 The Delaware Court of Chancery has moved in a
similar direction, giving preference to larger shareholders when
determining the leadership structure in shareholder lawsuits.262 In other
words, as much as we say that plaintiffs do not matter, lawmakers continue
to think they do. Given the problems with other monitors in securities class
actions, lawmakers have good reason to think that plaintiffs matter.
This analysis does not mean that plaintiffs are a panacea. Large,
institutional shareholders can be co-opted in many of the same ways as
attorneys. Any hope that institutions would be unbiased monitors has been
dashed by allegations that large pension funds may be trading their
participation in litigation for campaign contributions.263 These problems do
not mean that plaintiffs are irrelevant—instead, they simply mean that
258. See, e.g., In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 220 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that the
auction procedure used by the district court violated the PSLRA).
259. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Lawyers on the Auction Block: Evaluating the Selection of Class
Counsel by Auction, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 650, 727–28 (2002); Randall S. Thomas & Robert G.
Hansen, Auctioning Class Action and Derivative Lawsuits: A Critical Analysis, 87 NW. L. REV.
423, 434–36 (1993). Stephen Choi and Robert Thompson similarly found that the PSLRA’s
mandate that courts conduct a Rule 11 inquiry at the end of every securities class action has had
minimal impact. See Stephen J. Choi & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Litigation and Its Lawyers:
Changes During the First Decade After the PSLRA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1489, 1507–11 (2006).
260. John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability Seriously, 110 COLUM.
L. REV. 288, 308 (2010).
261. This aim is clear from the legislative history. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 34
(1995) (Conf. Rep.) (“The Conference Committee believes that increasing the role of institutional
investors in class actions will ultimately benefit shareholders and assist courts by improving the
quality of representation in securities class actions.”).
262. See Hirt v. U.S. Timberlands Serv. Co. LLC, No. 19575, 2002 WL 1558342, at *2 (Del.
Ch. June 18, 2002).
263. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi et al., The Price of Pay to Play in Securities Class Actions, U.
Mich. Law & Econ., Empirical Legal Stud. Ctr. Paper No. 09-025, at 2 (2011),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1527047.
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plaintiffs are one piece of a larger puzzle. Judges, attorneys, and
shareholders are all imperfect monitors, and therefore none of them alone
is sufficient. The best hope for curbing the agency costs inherent in
shareholder litigation is legal rules that give all of these actors greater
incentives to act in the best interests of absent class members.
How do professional plaintiffs fit into this analysis? If the ideal lead
plaintiff is an institutional shareholder with strong financial incentives to
monitor the litigation, some professional plaintiffs are about as far from
this ideal as we can get. Many professional plaintiffs own a relatively small
number of shares in the target corporation, which means that they have
little financial interest to monitor the litigation. Moreover, some have other
interests that cause them to turn a blind eye when their attorneys make
decisions that are contrary to the interests of the class. These interests may
include familial relationships, the promise of future business, or even
illegal kickbacks. In short, money or other interests may separate
professional plaintiffs from the rest of the class.
The research on professional plaintiffs also demonstrates that these
problems may go deeper than we previously imagined. Conventional
wisdom holds that institutional plaintiffs increasingly control shareholder
litigation. This wisdom may quell concerns about the problems in
shareholder litigation because these institutions, for all their faults, are
better guardians of shareholder interests than the plaintiffs of the past. As a
result, it may be easy for commentators to dismiss the problems in
shareholder litigation if they believe that these problems will be solved as
institutions extend their reach. The research on professional plaintiffs
shows that this belief is misplaced. Institutions play a role in shareholder
litigation, to be sure, but so do professional plaintiffs. Indeed, the sheer
number of cases filed by repeat and other individual plaintiffs suggests that
institutional plaintiffs are not on their way to dominating all of these cases.
The evidence instead suggests that shareholder litigation is moving
toward a bifurcated litigation model. Under this new model, institutions
control larger, more high-profile lawsuits, while professional plaintiffs and
other individual shareholders control many smaller lawsuits with little
money at stake. This model explains the persistence of professional
plaintiffs. These plaintiffs do not file the cases that institutional plaintiffs
want to control. In many instances, professional plaintiffs file the lawsuits
that institutional plaintiffs want to avoid.264 As a result, the rise of
institutional plaintiffs may not mean much for the large number of
shareholder lawsuits dominated by professional plaintiffs.265 These smaller
264. Not all cases fall into this bifurcated model. In many cases in my data set, the repeat
plaintiff filed a complaint along with other plaintiffs, including institutional plaintiffs. In many of
these cases, the institutional plaintiff was either appointed lead plaintiff or appeared to control the
suit.
265. The bifurcated litigation model also has implications for exit-based reforms proposed by
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suits may not grace the front pages of the Wall Street Journal, but they still
have important consequences for investors who see their returns
diminished by what can amount to a litigation tax on mergers or other
corporate decisions.
In the end, despite all of the rhetoric to the contrary, plaintiffs matter.
Scholars have long preached the dangers of a pure entrepreneurial model,
yet the legal system has done little to address the problem of professional
plaintiffs. To eliminate professional plaintiffs from shareholder litigation,
states must consider legal reforms that ensure a more meaningful role for
shareholder plaintiffs.
B. A Disclosure-Based Solution
States should address the problem of professional plaintiffs by adopting
a disclosure-based regime that brings attention to these possible conflicts
of interest. Part II outlined a number of potential conflicts that can affect a
plaintiff’s ability to protect absent class members. Under the current
system, however, the court only learns about these conflicts if the
defendant investigates the shareholder plaintiff or if the court conducts its
own inquiry into the plaintiff’s qualifications. As discussed above,
however, defendants often do not have the proper incentives to investigate
plaintiffs, and few courts fill this gap with their own inquiry.266
States can alter these incentives by requiring disclosure of potential
conflicts of interest. A few jurisdictions have experimented with such
requirements. The Delaware Court of Chancery, for example, requires the
plaintiffs in class actions and derivative suits to sign a certification that
they have not “received, been promised or offered and will not accept any
form of compensation” for participating in the litigation.267 The PSLRA
requires plaintiffs to file a similar certification. These rules address some,
but not all, of the concerns outlined in Part II.
New certification rules should sweep more broadly. States should
require shareholder plaintiffs in representative litigation to attach a signed
certification to their complaint that would include at least four types of
information.
First, the certification should include a statement that the plaintiff will
not accept any payment for serving as a representative party other than
their pro rata share of the recovery, except as ordered or approved by the
court. This rule would not prohibit plaintiffs from receiving compensation
some scholars. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability
Seriously, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 288, 298 (2010) (proposing reforms that would make it easier for
shareholders to opt out of class actions). Given the low dollar values at stake in most of these suits,
as well as the slim chance of success, large institutional investors do not have an incentive to opt
out of the class and file their own independent actions. Id. at 327.
266. See discussion supra Subsection II.D.3.
267. Del. Ch. R. 23(a) and 23.1(b).
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for reasonable costs and expenses. This rule is similar to those under both
Delaware law and the PSLRA.
Second, the certification should identify all shareholder lawsuits filed
by the named plaintiff over the past several years. This requirement reflects
the fact that shareholders may not be effective monitors if they are
participating in a significant number of lawsuits. It also recognizes that
attorneys will be less likely to push the envelope if they have to justify
their litigation decisions to a broader group of shareholders.
The PSLRA includes a similar requirement, but may not go far enough.
The PSLRA requires plaintiffs to identify all other securities class actions
“in which the plaintiff has sought to serve as a representative party.”268
Many shareholders appear to have interpreted this requirement to require
disclosure only of the suits in which shareholders have sought to serve as
lead plaintiff. Many shareholders do not disclose suits they have filed
where they have not sought to serve as the lead plaintiff. In many
shareholder lawsuits filed under state law, however, the court does not
appoint a lead plaintiff. Instead these suits are often litigated under a joint
leadership structure involving numerous shareholders and attorneys.
Accordingly, certification requirements in these suits should include all
shareholder suits filed by the named plaintiff, even if the plaintiff did not
ultimately seek to serve as lead plaintiff in the litigation.
Moreover, the certification should cover suits filed in all jurisdictions.
Congress was able to accomplish its objective because all securities class
actions fell within its jurisdiction. In contrast, shareholder lawsuits brought
under state law are typically filed in state or federal courts across the
country. Imagine, for example, if Delaware adopted a rule requiring
disclosure of prior suits filed in its courts. An enterprising plaintiff could
easily circumvent this requirement by filing additional suits in California,
Nevada, or any other jurisdiction. One could imagine plaintiffs playing a
game of litigation hopscotch as they moved throughout the country filing
lawsuits. To prevent this possibility, states should require disclosure of any
corporate or securities lawsuit in which the shareholder has sought to serve
as a representative plaintiff, not just lawsuits filed in that particular
jurisdiction.
Third, the certification should identify all of the plaintiff’s transactions
in the stock at issue during the relevant time period. This requirement
mirrors a similar requirement in the PSLRA. Extending this requirement to
shareholder suits filed under state law has two intended goals. First, this
certification would help ensure that named plaintiffs actually owned stock
in the target corporation during the relevant time period, a concern
discussed in Section II.D. Second, this certification would highlight the
plaintiff’s stock ownership to the court, allowing the court to exercise
268. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(2)(A)(v).
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special oversight in cases where the plaintiff has little financial interest in
the litigation.
Finally, the certification should include disclosure of any business,
financial, or familial relationships between the plaintiff and plaintiffs’
counsel. This requirement is not currently part of any certification regimes,
but there is a strong argument that it should be. As discussed in Part II,
some lawyers appear to be using their family members or business partners
as plaintiffs in shareholder suits. These relationships have the potential to
undermine the plaintiffs’ ability to effectively monitor their counsel. States
should address this problem by requiring plaintiffs to disclose material
relationships with their counsel. If the plaintiff is an institution, the
plaintiff should also disclose whether plaintiffs’ counsel has a financial
interest in the institution.
This rule should cover all attorneys involved in the litigation, even if
the attorney has not entered an appearance in the case. This rule reflects the
fact that there may be more attorneys involved in the litigation than are
listed on the docket. For example, attorneys who refer the plaintiff to lead
counsel often do not enter a formal appearance. Other attorneys may
perform work on the case behind the scenes, perhaps as part of a
committee of attorneys working under the supervision of lead counsel.
New rules should require disclosure of relationships with any of these
attorneys, recognizing that the potential for conflict does not depend on
whether the attorney has entered an appearance in the case.
This rule should also cover campaign contributions by attorneys. Many
public pension funds are repeat filers of securities class actions and other
shareholder lawsuits. There are allegations that these funds may be trading
their participation in litigation in exchange for campaign contributions.269
Certification requirements could target this problem by requiring
institutional plaintiffs to disclose any campaign contributions from any of
the attorneys involved in the litigation.
These disclosure rules would have two distinct benefits. First, they
would give courts the information they need to carry out their
responsibilities. Professional plaintiffs flourish because many courts do not
know to look for them. Yet, even if courts seldom conduct their own
investigations, few would turn a blind eye once potential problems are
revealed.
Second, these rules would discourage plaintiffs’ attorneys from relying
on problematic plaintiffs. If plaintiffs are required to disclose material
information about themselves, their attorneys would have less incentive to
push the envelope. For example, attorneys may be unlikely to use their
spouses or children as plaintiffs if they know that these relationships must
be disclosed in a certification to the court. Similarly, attorneys may be less
269. See supra note 93.
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likely to use plaintiffs who own only a few shares of stock in the target
corporation if they have to disclose the plaintiff’s stock ownership in the
certification. In this way, disclosure rules could not only bring problems to
the attention of courts—they could also change litigation practices on the
ground.270
These certification requirements would not solve all of the problems in
shareholder litigation. These requirements are intended to uncover
potential conflicts of interest between the named plaintiff and the rest of
the class.271 Yet the ideal plaintiff is not just an unbiased shareholder. The
ideal plaintiff is also knowledgeable about the case and willing to monitor
class counsel. Many shareholders, even those who are not professional
plaintiffs, have inadequate incentives to perform these responsibilities.
Moreover, even the most motivated plaintiffs will still have limited control
over the litigation, given the economic reality of contingency fee cases. Yet
certification requirements would uncover the most egregious problems,
setting the stage for additional reforms in this area down the road.
Ultimately, the debate over professional plaintiffs reflects a deeper
debate over the gatekeepers in entrepreneurial litigation. The law expects
shareholder plaintiffs to serve a gatekeeping function, yet does little to
ensure that plaintiffs meet this expectation. The legal system must do more
to encourage plaintiffs to cast a watchful eye over the litigation.
Shareholder litigation is uniquely suited for these reforms because many
shareholders have the financial stake necessary to take an active role in
litigation. Professional plaintiffs undermine this effort, putting lawsuits
back in the hands of plaintiffs’ attorneys. In the end, professionalism is
often a good thing—but not when it comes to choosing plaintiffs.
CONCLUSION
In shareholder derivative suits and acquisition class actions across the
country, plaintiffs’ attorneys appear to be using the exact same practices
that provoked Congress’s ire almost twenty years ago. Some attorneys are
using the same plaintiffs in dozens of suits. Others are relying on their
close relatives to serve as plaintiffs. As the first study of its kind, this
Article shows that professional plaintiffs have been hiding right under our
noses all along.
These findings have implications even outside the bounds of corporate
law. Shareholder litigation is one type of entrepreneurial litigation, and the
270. It is obviously possible that plaintiffs or their attorneys could lie in these certifications.
An attorney who is willing to make ethically suspect payments to plaintiffs may also be willing to
make false representations to the court. It is more likely, however, that the attorneys push the
envelope because they know that no one is looking. A system that forces disclosure will reduce this
temptation.
271. Or, in a shareholder derivative suit, conflicts between the named plaintiff and the
corporation on whose behalf the suit was brought.
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same incentives that drive shareholder litigation often drive other types of
entrepreneurial litigation as well. Are the practices uncovered in
shareholder litigation common in other types of entrepreneurial litigation?
If so, what are the implications for the legal system more broadly? These
questions remain for another day, but one thing is clear. Professional
plaintiffs are back, and the time has come for a new solution to this old
problem.
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